

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD  
OFFICE OF MARINE SAFETY

**INTERVIEW OF MR. SCOTT WADDLE, CDR, USN, (RET)  
IN REGARD TO THE MAJOR MARINE ACCIDENT -  
COLLISION OF THE  
JAPANESE FISHERIES TRAINING VESSEL EHIME MARU  
AND THE U.S. NAVY NUCLEAR ATTACK SUBMARINE  
USS GREENVILLE  
DCA 01 MM 022**

Thursday, March 14, 2002

APPEARANCES:

On behalf of the National Transportation  
Safety Board:

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1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 10:00 a.m.

3 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: The time is now ten hundred.  
4 The date is the 14th of March, 2002, and here -- we're  
5 here to interview Mr. Scott Waddle.

6 My name is Tom Roth-Roffy of the National  
7 Transportation Safety Board, and also joining in will  
8 be Mr. Barry Strauch of the -- NTSB.

9 Also present is Mr. Waddle's wife, Jill.

10 I don't know, Barry, if this -- how well this  
11 is going to pick up. You're quite a distance from this  
12 mike, but --

13 MR. STRAUCH: I'll do what I can. Tell us  
14 about ~~--- (inaudible) ---~~ Admiral Konetzni?

15 MR. WADDLE: That's not relevant to the  
16 interview, is it? Or --

17 MR. STRAUCH: Well, was -- was he in your  
18 line of supervision?

19 MR. WADDLE: He was. I -- he was the  
20 commander of the submarine force Pacific Fleet --  
21 ~~(inaudible)~~ -- Sea Two Star, and the individual that --  
22 I did not directly report to him. I was an indirect  
23 report. My boss, Captain Rich Snead, who is the  
24 commander of Southern Submarine Squadron One, would

1 have had a more direct report to the admiral, but any  
2 reports that he would have made would have been through  
3 the chief of staff, Captain Bob --  
4 ~~(inaudible)~~ Brandhuber.

5 MR. STRAUCH: So, your line of supervision to  
6 Admiral -- ~~(inaudible)~~ Konetzni-- was through Captain  
7 Snead, then through Captain -- ~~(inaudible)~~ Brandhuber --  
8 and then to Admiral -- Konetzni ~~(inaudible)~~?

9 MR. WADDLE: Yes. You could -- you could  
10 look at it that, but my day-to-day interaction with a  
11 supervisor would have been with my squadron commander,  
12 and that is Captain Rich Snead.

13 MR. STRAUCH: Well, the reason I asked about  
14 Admiral ~~--- (inaudible) ---~~ Konetzni is -- one of the  
15 things that I picked up from the court of inquiry is  
16 that Admiral -- ~~(inaudible)~~ Konetzni said he --  
17 something to the effect of he loved you like a son, and  
18 you said that you -- that you loved him. That just  
19 struck me as odd.

20 MR. WADDLE: Well, we had a -- we had a --  
21 not only a professional but a personal relationship as  
22 well. He was a mentor. He was my teacher, and he was  
23 a man that I thought had values that I truly supported.  
24 And he was interested in a sailor's quality of life on

1 several initiatives that were not very favorable at the  
2 time that I took command back in March of 1999, but his  
3 -- his themes of people, efficiency, and engagement  
4 were not far from those three themes that I've  
5 fostered, which were safety, efficiency, and backup.

6 I met Admiral ~~Kinetsnee~~Konetzni (ph) Konetzni  
7 as a lieutenant when I passed my engineer's exam in  
8 1986, when he was the deputy commandant of midshipmen  
9 at the Naval Academy, and he was one of the few  
10 officers that slapped me on the back -- submarine  
11 officers, that patted me on the back and said, "Hey,  
12 good job, congratulations," and he was kind of a  
13 cheerleader, kind of like me.

14 So, our -- our personalities were -- were  
15 very much alike, and I didn't have any close -- close  
16 interaction with him until I was an executive officer  
17 on the San Francisco a number of years later, in  
18 approximately 1994 when he was the commander of  
19 Southern Submarine Group Seven in ~~Kusco~~Yokosuka (ph),  
20 Yokosuka Japan. My submarine was on deployment and I  
21 happened to meet him again and reminded him that he was  
22 one of the key individuals that inspired me to stay in  
23 the Navy. Back in the mid '80s it wasn't uncommon for  
24 commanding officers and senior submariners to kind of

1 eat the young, that is the JOs, and berate them,  
2 castigate them, cast them aside because the economy was  
3 poor and it was plentiful to get officers.

4 So, what does all this have to do with  
5 ~~Kinetsnee~~KonetzniKonetzni? He was an inspirational  
6 officer. He was -- he was gregarious. He was  
7 engaging. He was charismatic. He spoke his mind. He  
8 was -- he was brilliant, a very smart man, and I  
9 admired all those qualities. And when he was passed  
10 over for his third star, there were a lot of people  
11 that didn't believe that his career would continue, but  
12 he had developed such a popular following with the  
13 Senate because, again, he spoke up over the concern of  
14 the number of submarines, the decline -- declining  
15 number, the fact that we weren't building, the -- the  
16 issues in -- on a global basis that -- with more and  
17 more submarines. There were several platforms that he  
18 stood on that weren't very popular, but nevertheless,  
19 he spoke his mind and he did what he thought was right.

20 And then, when the tides of change occurred  
21 and people realized, you know, we'd better get on this  
22 bandwagon and -- and carry through, suddenly he found  
23 himself being a popular individual, but nevertheless,  
24 he burned a lot of bridges because of his opinions.

1 And Congress, when they saw that he was passed over, a  
2 select few initiated a bill. I don't know if it was  
3 one that was tied onto the end of a large bill, but he  
4 was promoted.

5 And we maintained a very close relationship  
6 throughout my two-year tour and command. We had dinner  
7 at his house. We had mutual friends. It was a -- a  
8 person -- we both like to smoke cigars, we both like  
9 wine and scotch, we both like our jobs. We love the  
10 Navy. We're very passionate about our men. He enjoyed  
11 the success of his efforts, I enjoy the success of  
12 mine, and we both knew that the key to that success was  
13 taking care of our people.

14 And I openly voiced my opinion, my support of  
15 him, despite what others may have thought, and that's  
16 why on that day, you know, he said he loved me as a son  
17 and I said I loved him as a father, because I admired  
18 and respected him. However, the one thing that I  
19 still, to this day, don't recall was the conversation  
20 we had in my stateroom which he said, hey, I think  
21 you're going a little bit too fast, you're getting  
22 ahead of your crew. And I -- you know, coming from a  
23 man that's your mentor and you admire and you respect,  
24 that's something that generally you'd -- you'd

1 remember.

2 Now, it's also not uncommon for me to be --  
3 and if I had him on my ship, be excited at the fact  
4 that he was there, and I could have completely ~~--- lets~~ |  
5 not -- you know, missed it, but the bottom line is, is  
6 that a comment like that I think I would have  
7 remembered because I would have taken it a little bit  
8 more seriously.

9 And when he said that I was the one man that  
10 he found that was informal on the ship, I find that  
11 hard to believe. I've never been informal with my men.

12 Not in a -- not in a professional manner where a flag  
13 officer was on board, for that matter of fact, when any  
14 guest or visitor was on board. Men as a group can be  
15 candid in a private, you know, situation, but no, I --  
16 I -- I didn't agree with that.

17 But that's how our relationship was fostered,  
18 and essentially, he knew that I was equally as  
19 engaging, gregarious, and charismatic with guests, and  
20 so that's why the Greenville was selected on numerous  
21 occasions to -- to show what the Pacific Submarine  
22 Force was capable of doing. The ship was good. It was  
23 well-run, great crew, fantastic organization. They're  
24 good men.

1           MR. STRAUCH: When he would select the  
2 Greenville for these kinds of --

3           MR. WADDLE: Not he personally, his staff.  
4 See, you have to understand, the admiral -- the admiral  
5 makes a lot of big, important decisions, but his staff  
6 primarily would have been the public -- the individual  
7 that made the decision to call the Greenville was  
8 Rowena (ph), who worked at the Public Affairs Office.  
9 She's a civilian. When we were in San Francisco,  
10 California, in January of 2001, -- pick up the phone or  
11 initiated a conversation to say, hey, can we get the  
12 Greenville to do this? I always said, "yes." I never  
13 said, "no." If Sub Pac requested a VIP embark or some  
14 type of a tour, whether it was for Pat O'Brien of  
15 "Access Hollywood" or it was from Jack -- I can't  
16 remember the -- the individual's name, but he's from a  
17 thinktank in Washington, D.C. and I've got his business  
18 card someplace.

19           You know, we had -- we had a large number of  
20 guests and visitors that would come to the ship. Not  
21 every one was an envoy-embark -- you know we didn't go  
22 to sea (inaudible) -- but primarily, the Public Affairs  
23 Office would get the request and it was Commander Dave  
24 Warner who would detail these requests to one of the



1 two civilians in the job, Laura or Rowena. I get the  
2 call, hey, Commander Waddle, can you do this? Sure I  
3 can. I was golfing one day at the Navy Marine Golf  
4 Course, and I got the call when I was on the back nine,  
5 hey, we've got Pat O'Brien, ~~Sink Pac~~ CINCPACFLEET —  
6 ~~(inaudible)~~ ~~in~~, that is Admiral Fargo's office,  
7 would like to have a tour set up for him, can you  
8 support it? I said, Pat -- Pat who? I didn't know who  
9 he was, but when I recognized the name of the show, I  
10 said, "sure."

11 So, a quick round of golf, met him, gave him  
12 a tour, and it was a hit, you know. It was good.  
13 There wasn't anything that I wouldn't do to help  
14 promote our service.

15 But that request did not come from Admiral  
16 ~~Kinetsnee~~ Konetzni, to my knowledge, directly. If  
17 anything, it came through his subordinates. And then,  
18 how that got to me, I don't remember if it was through  
19 the Naval Submarine Support Command. I just don't  
20 remember the phone call I got, but I remember that I  
21 did get a call on or around January 24th asking me,  
22 could you embark these visitors and guests. The thing  
23 I picked up on is, Admiral Mackey will be there and  
24 Admiral ~~Kinetsnee~~ Konetzni will embark, and as soon as I

1 heard those two, I said, heck yeah, I'll do it.  
2 Because anytime that I could take a former Pacific  
3 Fleet -- excuse me, commander in chief of the Pacific  
4 and my boss, Admiral ~~Kinetsnee~~Konetzni, out, I would do  
5 it in a heartbeat -- (inaudible) -- because it was an  
6 opportunity for me to show my men, not me -- it wasn't  
7 about me. It was about showing my crew and -- and  
8 these guys because they worked hard to deserve it and  
9 it was all about promoting the men on my ship.

10 MR. STRAUCH: Do you know of other COs --  
11 ~~(inaudible)~~how would you compare them -- were they  
12 willing to -- to have these kinds of tours, DV tours  
13 and ~~---~~ (inaudible)?

14 MR. WADDLE: I -- I don't think that a --  
15 most -- most submarines -- submarine skippers and crews  
16 see tours as a red-ass. You know, it interrupts your  
17 day, you've got -- you've got to stop what you're doing  
18 and clean the ship, get things stowed, prepare for it.

19 So, there are a select few that would do it because,  
20 well, it was their turn. You know, tours were set up  
21 on a rotating basis as -- as months would pass. So,  
22 January it might be Submarine Squadron One, February is  
23 Squadron Three, March might be Submarine Squadron  
24 Seven. It just depended. And the times when usually

1 we got most of our calls would be when there was either  
2 something very special or there was a need or a short-  
3 fused ~~---(inaudible)---~~ event where no one else was  
4 available.

5           Were other captains willing? I think most  
6 captains enjoyed showing off their submarines when they  
7 could, if they weren't in a maintenance availability,  
8 because it was an opportunity to tell the submarine's  
9 story, which is what Admiral ~~Kinetsnee~~Konetzni wanted  
10 us to do. And it's something that we needed to do  
11 because we saw that our -- our force was in jeopardy of  
12 not having the adequate funding. We haven't been  
13 building submarines as -- as frequently as we had in  
14 the earlier part of my career, and the numbers had been  
15 drawn down. The demands placed on the ships had  
16 continued to increase. The mission requirements had  
17 continued to grow while the numbers had dwindled, so  
18 you know, a lot of -- lot of pressure's out there, and  
19 so we had collateral jobs. Other than commanding a  
20 submarine, we had to become public affairs experts.

21           MR. STRAUCH: And how did this get down to  
22 you, that you had to do ~~---(inaudible)---affect you---~~  
23 these collateral duties?

24           MR. WADDLE: Well, it -- it's -- you -- let

1 me ask you this, you know, in your job, how do you know  
2 what you have to do? Through observation you learn,  
3 non-verbal communications and acts. You just -- it's  
4 -- it's part of the culture, and as the culture  
5 develops, you -- you learn to do that.

6 Now, in my case, I've always been kind of a  
7 cheerleader. I've never passed up an opportunity to  
8 take a group around and -- even on -- even on a  
9 weekend. If I drove in, because— you know, because I  
10 lived on the base. I only lived a couple miles away  
11 from the -- from the ship, from the boat. But if I was  
12 driving in on a Saturday and I said, Honey, I'm -- I'm  
13 going away for a short period of time, I'll be back  
14 about half an hour, well, you know, that might turn  
15 into a two-and-a-half, three-hour event. Why? Because  
16 there may be somebody walking by the submarine that  
17 expresses an interest, wants a tour, and I'd say, let  
18 me take you down. They don't know who I am. I'm just  
19 another guy in a pair of shorts, aloha shirt, and  
20 shoes, and they're surprised at the fact that a  
21 commanding officer on his time off would take the time  
22 out of his day to do that. That was the way that I did  
23 business. Other captains, I guarantee you, wouldn't  
24 give people the time of day. Why? Because their

1 personal time is too valuable. That's not to say that  
2 mine wasn't, but I knew that I enjoyed that.

3 I loved it, I lived -- I lived to tell my  
4 ship's story, and I made a lot of friends that way and  
5 valuable friends, dear friends, lifelong friends  
6 because of my sincere desire to be a good person, a  
7 good Samaritan, and a -- and a good captain. You know,  
8 I felt that there was more to it than just getting up,  
9 go in the morning, operating a submarine, and getting  
10 back. This -- I -- I put my heart, my soul, my  
11 character into my job, and I've always done that. And  
12 so, that's -- that was me.

13 Other captains, I can guarantee you, they  
14 could care less if they saw somebody on the brow  
15 ~~(SHOULD THAT BE BOW???)~~ in the pouring rain, they may  
16 say, hi, how you doing, but they'd walk off and they  
17 wouldn't think twice. A lot of it is driven by  
18 personality.

19 MR. STRAUCH: Now, on the DV cruises, were  
20 you given any kind of direction as to things that you  
21 couldn't do?

22 MR. WADDLE: No. There -- there was no  
23 formal guidance put into place. There were no  
24 restrictions, no instructions, notices, or whatever

1     that said this -- during the course of a distinguished  
2     visitor cruise this is what you shall do. Now, that  
3     may have changed since the event, but that's not to say  
4     that information wasn't available and perhaps hadn't  
5     been circulated on the waterfront, but I don't  
6     specifically recall ever getting a document that says,  
7     you know, when you have a Class A tour this is what you  
8     shall do.

9             Now, there was an instruction that  
10     specifically dictated the protocol that was involved in  
11     -- in greeting dignitaries of different types of tours.  
12     If it was a Class A tour, then that mean -- meant that  
13     it was someone like a congressional delegation or a --  
14     a dignitary from, you know, a political structure or  
15     whatever, a senior military officer, whatever, that  
16     warranted special attention. Then, if it was a Class -  
17     - I don't remember the numbers. Maybe it was Category  
18     1, 2, 3, or 4, whatever, A, B, C, or D, but the lower  
19     the category, the less formality was invoked.

20             And I would just say, for that day, for the  
21     DV cruise that I had, there were no set of instructions  
22     or requirements or guidelines to say, this is what  
23     you'll do, this is the timeline you'll follow, this is  
24     what we expect. It was, take this group to sea, do

1     what you normally do, and come back. And -- and that  
2         -- you know, there's no prohibition against an  
3     emergency blow, there's no prohibition against high-  
4     speed operations. It's up to the prudent decision of  
5     the commanding officer at the time to determine what is  
6     appropriate.

7             And for me, I -- I've taken -- I've seen  
8     guests taken to test depth before. I've seen the  
9     emergency blow maneuvers performed. The reason most  
10    commanding officers don't do the emergency blow on  
11    older submarines is because they're afraid they're  
12    going to break something. It is -- it is a procedure  
13    that primarily is reserved for just that, an emergency  
14    evolution. But I could kill two birds in one stone. I  
15    could get a maintenance event completed at the same  
16    time as showing a distinguished visitor group or I can  
17    validate or verify that the equipment is operating  
18    correctly.

19            Because, I always had two different  
20    philosophies in doing these things. One, I always had  
21    new people on board my ship, young, impressionable men  
22    who had never been out to sea before, who had never  
23    driven a submarine at speeds greater than 25 ~~naughts~~  
24    knots or gone deeper than -- (inaudible) -- feet. And

1     so, I would do that each and every opportunity that I  
2     had to prove to them that this is what this machine is  
3     capable of doing so that they become comfortable in  
4     that environment. Conduct an emergency blow evolution  
5     so that they see it, they feel it, they know that in an  
6     -- if a need arose, we could do the emergency ascent to  
7     the surface and they've got the added feeling of  
8     comfort and confidence, knowing that the equipment  
9     works. And don't think for a minute that there aren't  
10    people that go to sea brand-new, never been to sea or  
11    much less submerged underwater, and aren't scared.

12             And so, that was all part of the plan -- part  
13    of this -- part of not -- part of the discussion at the  
14    court of inquiry. Never even entered into it. And it  
15    was not considered to be, probably, relevant. But to  
16    answer your question again, was there a set procedure  
17    guideline, set of instructions, no, there wasn't. Is  
18    there now? Can't tell you, but probably a good  
19    question to ask.

20             MR. STRAUCH: Well, if you read the court of  
21    inquiry, it looks like they focused on a couple of  
22    things. They focused on the emergency blow --

23             MR. WADDLE: Mm-hmm.

24             MR. STRAUCH: -- they focused on the test



1 depth -- ~~(inaudible)~~ classified speed -- the  
2 watch dogbill --

3 MR. WADDLE: If you have a piece of paper I  
4 can write these things down on, I can address them.

5 MR. STRAUCH: Sure.

6 MR. WADDLE: I -- (inaudible).

7 (Pause)

8 MR. WADDLE: Okay. You said they focused on  
9 --

10 MR. STRAUCH: This is my reading of it. They  
11 focused on the emergency blow --

12 MR. WADDLE: Yeah.

13 MR. STRAUCH: -- they focused on the  
14 watch dogbill, --

15 MR. WADDLE: Yeah.

16 MR. STRAUCH: -- focused on the test depth,  
17 classified -- ~~(inaudible)~~ speed -- and they focused on  
18 the incident itself, the -- the --

19 MR. WADDLE: Well, you missed the -- watch  
20 qualification, personnel.

21 MR. STRAUCH: Yeah.

22 MR. WADDLE: And the -- go ahead.

23 MR. STRAUCH: Test depth -- test depth  
24 classified speed, the events during the -- during the

1 incident --

2 MR. WADDLE: Mm-hmm.

3 MR. STRAUCH: -- rushing of the -- the  
4 officer of the deck --

5 MR. WADDLE: Yeah. Command climate--  
6 ~~(inaudible)~~-- is another one.

7 MR. STRAUCH: Yeah, yeah. That's my reading  
8 of it.

9 MR. WADDLE: Okay.

10 MR. STRAUCH: In hindsight, do you think that  
11 they focused on the right things?

12 MR. WADDLE: No, it didn't. I'll tell you  
13 they didn't.

14 MR. STRAUCH: Okay.

15 MR. WADDLE: And -- because the whole thing -  
16 - you know, from my opinion -- in my opinion, the Navy  
17 wanted one thing, and that was to get a fall guy, point  
18 to one individual that was responsible. I'll tell you  
19 again, it was me as the captain. Captain's  
20 responsible, the captain is accountable. Why? Because  
21 he bears all the responsibility. And if there's  
22 something that's not done right on his watch, then he  
23 is the guy that's accountable. He's the guy that's  
24 responsible.

1           It's my opinion, after a year now, looking  
2 back on it all, that the Navy wanted to get this off  
3 the front page as fast as they could and put it behind  
4 them. And to do so, they needed to develop a case.  
5 They needed to show that, one, either I was haphazard,  
6 I was cavalier, I was showboating, I was more  
7 interested in the -- in the glamour and -- and the  
8 attention and showing off things rather than focusing  
9 on what's important. And to do that, they needed to  
10 focus on the fact that I took the submarine deeper than  
11 that which is advertised and faster than which is  
12 advertised to collect the deep water samples, the fact  
13 that I had -- I can't remember how many it was, nine  
14 out of 13 people not in a designated place on the watch  
15 bill, rushing the OD, focusing on what they considered  
16 to be -- or, at least my navigator -- former navigator  
17 Keith Sloane alluded to as a command climate where I  
18 was very controlling, micromanaging, et cetera, which  
19 couldn't be further from the truth. I'll take each one  
20 of these things in step.

21           The -- the emergency blow evolution, the MBT  
22 blow evolution, the reason Brandhuber said he thought  
23 that that was an uncommon thing to do was because he  
24 commanded a relatively older submarine. That was a San

1 Juan. At the time it was fairly new, but nevertheless,  
2 it was one of those things. You took a chance of  
3 having something break. This was on a Friday  
4 afternoon. I was scheduled for a Monday underway for  
5 an engine -- major engineering exam, and if one of  
6 these high-pressure air valves had a leak, that was  
7 significant work, quality assurance testing, and stuff  
8 that was required of the -- (inaudible) -- weekend. It  
9 certainly was an element of risk, but I'd just done all  
10 these tests. I knew the stuff worked, so I was  
11 confident and, frankly, didn't give it much thought  
12 thinking that something was going to break because,  
13 knock on wood, it hadn't before. It worked. My crew  
14 was good at what they did. The MBT blow was not an  
15 issue.

16 The fact I had civilians at key -- what was  
17 perceived as key watch stations, at the helm control,  
18 at the emergency ballast -- (inaudible) -- blow  
19 station, was made a point. Well, that's a bunch of  
20 bull shit. Excuse me for saying it, but it is. Why?  
21 Because they'd been there before and they've done it I  
22 can't tell you how many times before. And so, the Navy  
23 says, this is the first time we've ever known of  
24 civilians sitting at the controls. Tipper Gore was

1 sitting there in February of '99 and there's  
2 photographs showing her there. Now, was she doing an  
3 emergency blow ascent? No, but she was driving the  
4 ship under the supervision of a qualified and trained  
5 watchstander, as was the case on the day of my  
6 incident. A fully trained, fully qualified  
7 watchstander is standing with their hands interlaced  
8 over John Hall's at the emergency blow station and on  
9 the controls where the sportswriter, and I forgot his  
10 name, was sitting as well.

11 So, that -- I call that a red herring.  
12 Irrelevant to the incident. The watch bill, nine of 13  
13 people not in their designated spaces, irrelevant to  
14 the watch station. Admiral Sullivan said he found it  
15 incredulous that such a thing happened. Well, you know  
16 what? He's blowing smoke because the guys that worked  
17 for him, that knew him, saw him take his submarine to  
18 periscope depth, Birmingham, his trident, without doing  
19 ~~---(inaudible)---~~ --baffle clears, and he criticizes me.

20 Is the pot calling the kettle black? But you know  
21 what, there wasn't a form to address that. The fact  
22 is, the commanding officer has the discretion to do  
23 what he wants to do based on his environment, what he  
24 knows to be true, and he gets paid to make those

1 decisions. So, I'm sure those were smart decisions  
2 made by the admiral when he was in command.

3 But the fact that nine of 13 people not in  
4 their designated space, there was a complexity -- a  
5 complexity that day that is not -- is not known or  
6 understood unless you're in that environment. I had --  
7 I had less than two-thirds of my crew at sea that day.

8 Why? Because the rest of them were in port training,  
9 getting ready for this deployment. The individuals  
10 that were moving around were certainly not in their  
11 designated spot by the watch bill, but they were fully  
12 qualified personnel allowed to be in the seats that  
13 they and the positions that they were manning. Why?  
14 To support other sailors so they could go eat. You  
15 don't write a watch bill to cover watch reliefs or  
16 drinks or head breaks or whatever.

17 So, for that day, could the watch bill have  
18 been managed better? Yes. But again, irrelevant.  
19 Why? Because I had qualified people in their  
20 designated spaces, where they were supposed to be, to  
21 stand their watch.

22 Admiral Naft<sup>h</sup>man (ph) made it a point and  
23 called it "situational awareness." Now, that may be  
24 true because if I have men that are moving around and

1     they're not sitting in one place over the course of a  
2     four- or five-hour period, they may not have as much  
3     situational awareness as someone before them. But you  
4     know what? For sonar watchstanders who stand watch in  
5     the sonar room at two-hour rotating intervals or  
6     whatever, half an hour on one seat, half an hour on  
7     another, then half an hour off, their situational  
8     awareness is also impacted, and situational awareness  
9     depends upon a number of outside factors. But it's the  
10    responsibility of the individual relieving that watch  
11    station to fully understand the parameters of the  
12    environment that he is in before he sits down and says,  
13    I relieve you.

14               Now, if those guys didn't do that job and do  
15    it right, where there's a fire controlman not looking  
16    back at the contact evaluation plot or the officer of  
17    the deck coming in and taking a look at the CE plot  
18    time history, saying, you know what, we've been driving  
19    north-south legs this whole time instead of, maybe,  
20    east-west legs which might be more prudent to drive  
21    bearing rate to determine the contact picture to the  
22    north or the south or whatever.

23               Well, hindsight is a good thing, but I know  
24    that probably what ~~Cohen~~Coen, my OD, was thinking that

1 day is, I need to stay as close to the north as I can,  
2 as soon as the captain says we're ready to turn and  
3 surface and head back home, I'm going to get my butt  
4 chewed if I am motoring on down to the south, because  
5 he knows better. I mean, it'd just be stupid.  
6 ~~Cohen~~Coen was a smart officer. He wasn't a dummy. He  
7 may have been a little bit passive and not as  
8 aggressive, but -- and the fact is, is that he did what  
9 he knew was right, but doggone it, there were some  
10 other people there that could have backed him up and  
11 said, sir, we're not generating bearing rate and these  
12 contact -- fire controlman could have backed him up,  
13 sonar supe could have backed him up, the navigator who  
14 walked through Control could have seen it, the  
15 executive officer walking through could have seen it, I  
16 could have seen it. I'm just saying that there were  
17 some backups in place that didn't work that day.

18 But the watch bill was not an issue. What  
19 the court of inquiry focused on was an unqualified  
20 watchstander who was sitting in a chair operating the  
21 panel under the direct supervision of the sonar  
22 supervisor McGib~~bo~~veny (ph). And this young man was  
23 observing a practice which was common in the Pacific  
24 Fleet for submarines of our configuration.



1                   And the BS of it all is the fact that when  
2     ~~Sub Pac~~ SUBPAC found out that this had occurred, they  
3     sent a personal foremessage to the -- to the fleet  
4     saying, if this has occurred on your submarine, then  
5     submit a report and tell us that it's happened. Well,  
6     guess what, do you think your captains are idiots?  
7     Right after a collision do you honestly believe that a  
8     submarine captain is going to raise his hand and say,  
9     you know, Admiral, I've been so screwed up.  
10    Fortunately, I haven't hit anything, but you know, we  
11    don't do that here on the Louisville. Well, guess  
12    what? The Louisville had just been inspected the week  
13    before by one of the sonar team leaders, a sonar chief  
14    and I forgot what Jimmy's last name was, but he -- he  
15    looked at him, and he said, Captain, we can't believe  
16    it. You know, I'd say at least 35 to 40 percent of the  
17    fast-attack boats that have this ARCI submarine  
18    modification were doing things the way you were doing  
19    because there were no guidelines in place for it.

20                   Now, that doesn't excuse doing the thing, but  
21    I'd say it was common practice and it was served -- it  
22    was observed by the -- by the tacticians that do the  
23    monitoring of submarines by embarking and training  
24    things. And so, if that's changed and if the

1 guidelines for sonar manning has been changed, then  
2 that's good. The "Naval Warfare Publication" -- I  
3 can't recall specifically what the words were, but they  
4 may not have addressed ARCI modification because, quite  
5 frankly, we're at this phase in our -- in our -- in our  
6 technology development where technology changes faster  
7 than the paper can catch up with it.

8           So, that may be something that you may want  
9 to ask, is how have the procedures changed or been  
10 implemented, you know, for sonar watchstanders and  
11 perhaps, maybe, throughout the -- if other  
12 modifications to navigations operations equipment have  
13 occurred so that you've got the right people in place.

14           Well anyway, I believe that that's been  
15 adequately handled. The Sub Pac MMS have said, if  
16 you're doing this it's wrong, so if you've been doing  
17 it report it to me and let me know. Well, of course,  
18 response is zero, and I know that -- I know for a fact  
19 that that is -- that information was not valid. At the  
20 time there were other submarines doing it. That  
21 doesn't excuse it, but it's -- it's in hindsight. If  
22 this accident hadn't happened, it wouldn't be an issue.

23           MR. STRAUCH: I'm sorry. How do you know  
24 that's a fact?

1           MR. WADDLE: Because I told you, I got a  
2 direct report from a sonar chief -- I think he's a  
3 senior chief now -- who was on the Sub Pac staff who  
4 had just gotten off the Louisville the week before my  
5 accident and said, Captain, I saw that happen but all  
6 the reports were negative, it did happen. And I could  
7 tell you as a personal observer and a guy that goes out  
8 to coach, teach these submarine crews how to use this  
9 equipment, I've seen it happening all the time. It's  
10 common practice.

11           So, what I'm trying to tell you is, again,  
12 that was a ruse. Now, the thing with test depth and  
13 the classified speed, sure that's classified  
14 information, to go down to deep -- (inaudible) -- speed  
15 greater than 25 naughts. And I had been given a  
16 message, now that I think about it, that probably said  
17 that, you know, the -- personnel are not allowed back  
18 in the engine room and you should keep the  
19 classification of the tour to, you know, this level,  
20 and I think probably it was "unclassified." But you  
21 know, the fact of it is, is when you submerge the ship,  
22 the first thing you do is you take the covers off the  
23 depth meters, you take the covers off the speed  
24 indications, the GAM log, the -- the -- everything

1 about that submarine is classified when it goes to sea.

2 So, that to me is a joke, for them to make  
3 the test depth issue, the classification of the speed  
4 an issue. It was, again, another distract -- detractor  
5 from the real event, which was how did this accident  
6 happen. Let's get to the root cause. It's another red  
7 herring, irrelevant, but again, and from my impression,  
8 it was less -- let's show that this was a man who  
9 didn't either follow the rules or overlooked critical  
10 things and as such we can show that this is one fucked  
11 up naval officer, you know. Just call it a spade.  
12 Let's show how screwed up this guy was. Well, you  
13 know, you don't go from being the cream of the crop to  
14 lower than whale shit unless you have a collision and  
15 you kill people, and that's what I did and that's where  
16 I ended up.

17 But that's why the court of inquiry, in my  
18 opinion, failed to focus on the real facts, the issues.

19 And they -- they missed some key information. That  
20 was my testimony until I chose to do so at the very  
21 end, but then, you know, the guys were caught off  
22 guard, they weren't expecting it, hadn't been granted  
23 immunity and never expected that I would. But I  
24 couldn't interject and tell them about my command

1 climate. I couldn't challenge the things that Sloane  
2 had said. I couldn't interact because why? I have  
3 this fear of -- of me being unfairly prosecuted and  
4 used as a political pawn.

5 But you know, continuing on the watch  
6 qualifications, I think I addressed. The incident  
7 itself I think is clear, but I believe that perhaps  
8 there were -- I'll get back to that. I'm not sure  
9 about what the court of inquiry had missed, but there  
10 were some issues there that I believe, you know, I can  
11 help you out with.

12 Rushing the OD, I did give CohenCoen an  
13 artificial time constraint. There was no way he could  
14 get to periscope depth in five minutes.

15 You tell your kid, get this done in the next  
16 five -- go clean your room, I want it cleaned up in the  
17 next five minutes. You know it isn't going to happen.

18 I knew CohenCoen couldn't get there in five minutes.  
19 I gave him -- I should have said, in hindsight, I want  
20 to get to periscope depth now, or I want to get to  
21 periscope depth, not take all day getting there, Mr.  
22 CohenCoen, let's be efficient in this evolution and  
23 make it happen. I could have said a lot of things, but  
24 that artificial time constraint and the perception of

1 it did push things quickly.

2 MR. STRAUCH: Was there something about Mr.  
3 CohenCoen that --

4 MR. WADDLE: Yeah. CohenCoen -- CohenCoen  
5 was fricking slow. He -- and you know, he -- he was  
6 the wrong man to have on the watch bill at that time.  
7 And shame on me for -- for not recognizing that. And -  
8 - and Jerry Pfeifer (ph) for my exec and Keith Sloane,  
9 my senior watch officer, because I had young Lieutenant  
10 Will Pritchett, the shining star of the ward room, the  
11 top grad from the Naval Academy, one of my sharpest  
12 ODs, who had just as much experience as CohenCoen and  
13 was a better officer who could have made that thing  
14 happen, and if I had laid on him, he would have had the  
15 guts to look at me and say, Captain, you're pushing me,  
16 I need a couple more minutes, and I would have said  
17 okay. I'd have backed off.

18 But CohenCoen, you have to understand, he  
19 came about a month after I arrived on board the ship  
20 and has been so painfully slow through my whole career  
21 that I used to tell Jill when I'd get watch relief  
22 reports coming in at night, I'd say, my God, sometimes  
23 I just want to shoot myself when I have to listen to  
24 him tell me about his day because it takes forever for

1 me to get information out of him. He can't get to the  
2 important stuff. He can't tell me what's important.  
3 But I never berated him. I didn't humiliate him. I  
4 didn't embarrass him -- say, Mr. CohenCoen, get to the  
5 point, what are you trying to tell me? And because I  
6 remembered I hated being treated that way, too, when I  
7 was a junior officer, so I tried to teach him.

8 And on that day, you know, what was it about  
9 CohenCoen? Mr. CohenCoen, I want you at periscope  
10 depth in the next five minutes. Because he couldn't  
11 think ahead. I always tried to get my guys to think  
12 about the next -- when you give an order, know what  
13 your next order is going to be, and if you can, know  
14 what the follow-on order beyond that is. So when you  
15 get the response you give -- when you hear the  
16 response, you can give the next order, you don't have  
17 to say, okay, well, that's good, that's done, now, what  
18 do I need to do next? And he was very slow. Yeah,  
19 there was something about CohenCoen. That's true.

20 And unfortunately, on that day there was  
21 something about Seacrest, too, because despite his  
22 personal strength and as good as he was, he also was --  
23 (inaudible) -- that day, admitted so in the court of  
24 inquiry.

1           MR. STRAUCH: How -- did his behavior that  
2 day differ from his professional behavior as you knew  
3 it?

4           MR. WADDLE: Yeah, it did. And -- and I  
5 think -- I think, unfortunately, the behavior of the  
6 crew that day differed from the normal behavior of the  
7 crew because we'd been in port less than a week, we'd  
8 been gone for almost a whole month following the dry  
9 dock -- (inaudible) -- restricted availability. We had  
10 gone up to ~~Katchikan (ph)~~, Ketchikan-Alaska for acoustic  
11 trials and down to San Francisco for a four-day port  
12 visit, and then back to Pearl. And we -- we had just  
13 arrived that -- that previous weekend. A commodore had  
14 met us on the pier, and we had this big engineering  
15 exam, the operational reactor safeguard exam, coming  
16 up. And I remember them saying -- my -- (inaudible) --  
17 saying, Scott, you know, we really expect the  
18 Greenville to get an "excellent" on this inspection.  
19 The Buffalo just got one. And I thought, Commodore,  
20 what are you thinking? Because I looked over at -- at  
21 Tony Cortez, the deputy -- he's the guy that took --  
22 that filled in as the interim captain when I was fired  
23 -- I looked at him, I said, you know, on a good day  
24 we're going to be "average." And if we're really good



1 on that day, we'll be "above average," but "excellent,"  
2 I don't see it. Well, hey, then you know what, you get  
3 underway on Friday for this DV cruise, you stay out  
4 over the weekend, you can get at least another good  
5 drill set in or two, and then you can work up the rest  
6 of next week and then pick up the inspection team. I  
7 said, Commodore, no, I already promised my crew the  
8 weekend off and one extra drill set's not going to make  
9 us "excellent."

10 And so, you know, there -- because he didn't  
11 know jack about my submarine other than what I told  
12 him. He'd never been on board, that is going to sea on  
13 my submarine, and almost -- see, he -- his change of  
14 command was in August of 2000. The accident was in  
15 February. He had been on board my submarine two times,  
16 once at the -- once in -- actually, both of them were  
17 in the naval shipyard dry docking period when we were  
18 in SRA because I -- I had -- Commodore, come down, my  
19 crew needs to see you, you haven't been down yet.  
20 Because he'd been trying to -- he was trying to resolve  
21 problems on board the USS Los Angeles, which had a  
22 severe manning shortage in leadership, and so all of  
23 his efforts were focused on that.

24 And that's -- I'm not getting to -- your

1 question was, was it a typical day that day for  
2 Seacrest and ~~Cohen~~Coen. The answer is, no, it wasn't.

3 It was unique. The crew was complacent, including me  
4 to some degree, because we had a mission that day and  
5 it was to take these VIPs out on a lazy Friday and it  
6 was just another VP cruise, and that was wrong. That's  
7 one of the root causes and root issues that should have  
8 been addressed in the court of inquiry, is how even a  
9 submarine crew when they're great or a ship or aircraft  
10 crew, whatever, becomes so confident in their abilities  
11 that they sometimes take for granted their expertise  
12 and they become complacent. And that's what happened  
13 on that day. It was unbelievable how, I guess,  
14 complacency just set in, and that was not the norm.  
15 That was not the way we did business.

16 And shame on me for getting wrapped up in the  
17 tour and -- and not focusing on the big picture as much  
18 as I should have. I thought I gave it the right  
19 balance, but in hindsight, I didn't. Why? Because I  
20 had a collision, you know.

21 But -- but back on this thing with Snead, he  
22 had never been on board my submarine. The first time  
23 he actually was on the submarine underway was after the  
24 personal transfer, the guests were off, and he rode me

1 from Dry Dock 4 into the pier area and moor. And  
2 that's not to say it's not his fault, but I'm just  
3 telling you that because the Greenville was running  
4 smoothly, the crew had such a great reputation, we had  
5 performed admirably in the dry docking selection  
6 restricted availability, Naval Reactors wasn't on our  
7 butt, and they usually just have problems to deal with.

8 The ship was clean. Burroughs, who's the senior Naval  
9 Reactors guy there, had praised our crew for the  
10 cleanliness, the state, the way that we've done  
11 business, no tag-out deficiencies. Unprecedented, the  
12 fact that we didn't have any tag-out issues. You know,  
13 that's a big deal. No critiques. Now, we reviewed  
14 some minor things, but no work-stop critiques.

15 It was phenomenal how these guys had done  
16 work, and that was considered status quo for the  
17 Greenville and par the course. We were and the crew  
18 was a damn fine organization. And so, the commodore,  
19 I'm sure in his opinion, could afford to not look at us  
20 despite my request to come down, please, just look at  
21 us, let my men know you care. You know, come down and  
22 look at -- no, I gotta look at the LA.

23 Then, the knife in the back was about three  
24 and a half months after the incident, the commodore

1 coming down and telling the crew of the Greenville,  
2 some day you guys'll be as good as the Los Angeles.  
3 You know what, pack sand, pal. He had his head up his  
4 rear end so far he couldn't see, forgetting where this  
5 ship had just been and where it'd come from. But you  
6 know what, such is the case when you fall from glory  
7 and when you fall in a blaze of glory like our ship  
8 did. People forget, you know, and the old saying of  
9 one "oh shit" rubs out a thousand "atta-boys," well,  
10 that was a big "oh shit" when that collision happened.

11 But that's -- that's -- that's what happened.

12 So, on that day, was the crew operating  
13 differently? You bet. It was not what I would say was  
14 the typical conduct of the Greenville on that day. My  
15 navigator wasn't as actively involved in the events as  
16 he could have been, providing oversight for the  
17 geographic plot, the -- not the geo plot, but the --  
18 the nav plot, the CEP. There were a number of  
19 individuals there beside myself that could have looked  
20 at the paper displays, the fire control displays, the  
21 nav plots, and figured out that we hadn't been doing  
22 what we should have probably been doing.

23 And I hate to say it, but a lot of times the  
24 two guys that really kept it together were the exec and

1     myself, as it should have been. But you know, that's  
2     why we were teachers. And so, if Jerry Pfeifer would  
3     walk through the control room and see something that's  
4     not right, he -- he'd fix it immediately. If I did the  
5     same thing or saw a deficiency, I'd fix it immediately  
6     as well. And so, that kind of tells you about the  
7     command climate.

8                 We -- we -- I say "we," I tried to foster the  
9     best command climate that I could on the ship where  
10    anybody could raise their hand if they had a question,  
11    an issue, and wanted to challenge a decision, an order,  
12    or an operation or something that was going on if they  
13    thought it was unsafe or if we were overlooking  
14    something. It was part of the backup. But you know,  
15    the court of inquiry jammed that up my rear end.  
16    Safety efficiency backup. Well, you sure weren't safe  
17    that day, were you, Captain? Efficient, well, you're  
18    running behind because your meal ran long. Backup,  
19    well, you removed yourself from that, too, didn't you?  
20    You know what, I hate to say it, we weren't living by  
21    those rules that day to the best of our ability. We  
22    could have done better, but you can always say that  
23    when you have an accident or an incident.

24                MR. STRAUCH: Well, part of the reason why

1 we're here is to give you a chance to help us focus on  
2 the big picture.

3 MR. WADDLE: Yeah.

4 MR. STRAUCH: So, what other things should  
5 the court of inquiry have looked at?

6 MR. WADDLE: They should have looked at the  
7 procedure itself. I think -- I'm going to say a couple  
8 things. The fact that we had distinguished visitors on  
9 board or how they got there was immaterial to the  
10 incident. Completely unrelated. If they wanted to --  
11 if the Navy wanted to launch an investigation, it  
12 should have been a separate investigation apart from  
13 the court of inquiry that determined exactly how the  
14 distinguished visitors got on board that submarine.  
15 The fact that they were there had -- had -- you can say  
16 it had a bearing and a relevance because -- to the  
17 incident because that was the only reason we went to  
18 sea that day.

19 But if you really want to focus on the cause  
20 of the accident, the procedure for conducting the  
21 emergency surfacing evolution is -- is one thing that  
22 -- that warranted review because there was no --  
23 there's no requirement to broach the ship -- it may  
24 have changed -- but there is a requirement because it's

1 good seamanship to make sure that there's no one in and  
2 around the area before you do this event because you  
3 don't want to hit them. I knew that. That's why I --  
4 I -- I thought I checked the area clear and then as I  
5 went deep reversed course to go back to the same spot  
6 that I had just checked. It makes sense. You don't go  
7 shoot a gun in your backyard -- most people don't --  
8 unless you know that there's nothing back there. You  
9 already checked, and you make sure it's clear before  
10 you pull that trigger on a rifle. So, I think that  
11 that issue was overlooked.

12 I also mentioned that, in hindsight, if a  
13 submarine is going to do an emergency surfacing  
14 evolution like that, then perhaps there ought to be a  
15 designated spot or an area where an evolution like that  
16 is performed or nautical charts are annotated for, you  
17 know, that region or zone as being a submarine training  
18 ground so that if surface ships transit through that,  
19 then they're required to have their fathometers or  
20 depth sounders on or whatever. But you know, we have a  
21 difficult enough time getting our own U.S. military  
22 surface ships to follow their rule, so how on earth are  
23 we going to get civilian ships to do that, too?  
24 Complicated.

1           So, again, the responsibility falls on that  
2 of the submarine crew to make sure that the surface is  
3 clear before you perform an evolution. But I  
4 personally would like to see that before an emergency  
5 blow is done that the high look is carried out and I --  
6 I believe that maybe that's done now.

7           The court of inquiry dissected the event and  
8 provided numerous charts, entered charts as evidence to  
9 show what they believed we saw that day at sea. And  
10 you know what, it's nice you can go back and  
11 reconstruct everything you want, but there's nothing  
12 like the real thing. There's nothing like being there  
13 to know exactly what happened. And -- and I could have  
14 Captain Tom Kyle take the stand and have a great blown-  
15 up chart, four and a half feet by five feet wide or  
16 whatever with big, fat dots showing bits of information  
17 and -- and projected high bearing rates of contacts  
18 that your sonar operator should see. Well, that's  
19 great, but how long have you been in this office, right  
20 now, sitting in this chair right now?

21           MR. STRAUCH: About an hour.

22           MR. WADDLE: Okay. An hour. Look at that  
23 white wall a second, please. Tell me what --

24           MR. STRAUCH: Okay.



1           MR. WADDLE:  -- what is the -- what is the  
2     photograph of behind you in the very center?  What's in  
3     that picture?

4           MR. STRAUCH:  I don't know.  I haven't looked  
5     at it.

6           MR. WADDLE:  Okay.  Well, you've been in here  
7     an hour.  Why didn't you know that that was a dog?  Why  
8     did you miss that?  You didn't see that was a dog?  
9     Clearly that's in front of you.  Can you not see that  
10    picture?  Do you get my point?  That picture is less  
11    than seven and a half feet away from you and I can see  
12    it clearly here as a dog, but guess what, unless you  
13    look for it, you're not going to see it.

14           And that's the point I'm trying to make here.  
15    It's great that we've got reconstructed data and that  
16    there's a sonar display, but unless that operator is so  
17    keen and intense on looking at that trace, it's  
18    possible he maybe didn't see it.  And so, the 15 or 20  
19    seconds' worth of data that was collected that was made  
20    such a big deal, well, you should have seen that high  
21    bearing rate trace, was missed.  Now, you've been  
22    sitting in this office for an hour and I would  
23    certainly think that you would have at least looked  
24    around this area and clearly seen that that picture

1       there was a dog. Well, that's exactly how I felt --

2                       (End of Tape 1, Side A)

3                       MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. We're back on the  
4       record.

5                       MR. WADDLE: All right. And public record or  
6       not, you know, there's a little bit of anger here in my  
7       voice, but I also had to maintain composure during that  
8       court of inquiry because I had a responsibility as a  
9       captain. I've also had a year to reflect upon this  
10      event, and I think that had this interview taken place  
11      a year ago, some of my responses may have been a little  
12      bit different. But I've had a chance to reflect very  
13      clearly on a lot of these things.

14                      So, the point is, is that on that day the --  
15      the cause of the accident was -- was because of a  
16      number of events. Not -- not one singular thing, I  
17      don't think, caused it. The fact that my ~~asvidu~~ASVDU  
18      (ph) was out of commission, and that was a very  
19      important screen. If I'd had that up and operating on  
20      the con, I would have realized I had, perhaps, three  
21      contacts that day instead of the two that I had -- I  
22      thought I had to the northwest and to the northeast.  
23      And there are a lot of what-ifs, but when my executive  
24      officer standing outside of sonar looked at me at the

1 point where I ordered the submarine to go to periscope  
2 depth, ~~Cohen~~Coen had done his sweeps and looked and  
3 said, "No close contacts," I looked at the flat panel  
4 display and saw no large silhouetted contacts. I  
5 didn't see anything small. I didn't see any contacts.

6 Sonar reported no close contacts, the ESM operator  
7 Carter who had -- I didn't know he had an under  
8 instruction watch on the headphones, but yet he was  
9 watching the display. Said ESM holds no close contacts  
10 or threat contacts.

11 To me, there were no contacts that were  
12 close. It -- it validated everything that I thought to  
13 be true. Had I changed my thought process and said  
14 approaching that periscope depth evolution from the  
15 perspective of I know I have two contacts, I think  
16 they're to the north, I think they're far away, and I  
17 don't expect to see anything, had I approached it from  
18 the perspective of I need to prove to myself that there  
19 might be something close in that I can't hear, that  
20 maybe we haven't seen, that I've missed -- and I  
21 believe as Admiral Fargo has said, you know, at the 24-  
22 month point in an individual's career, in a captain's  
23 career, he develops that -- he or she develops that  
24 sense of confidence that they know their ship, they

1 understand how to do their business, and that  
2 confidence can sometimes result in bad decisions.

3           It's easy to say that my short abbreviated  
4 search was a bad decision. That's so easy to say when  
5 you've had a collision and people have died. But if  
6 Jack -- I can't remember the guy's name who was sitting  
7 in the helms chair -- had taken 20 more seconds to get  
8 there and we'd continued to the left a course 346  
9 instead of me ordering my rudder and midships and then  
10 drifting to the left on an intercept course unbeknownst  
11 to us that would ultimately collide my submarine with  
12 the Ehime Maru, we wouldn't be sitting here having this  
13 conversation and I would have said, my God, how did --  
14 how the hell did that happen? How did we not know that  
15 that guy was there? And it would have been -- it would  
16 have been unbelievable, to pass the stern of the Ehime  
17 Maru or in front of it and see it go zipping by. Oh my  
18 gosh, that would have been incredible. That would have  
19 been one heck of a near-miss. And there are a lot of  
20 people that have had near-misses and, by the grace of  
21 God, -- situations.

22           But, you know, the -- the fact is, is that --  
23 that the ~~asvidu~~ASVDU, if it had been fixed prior to  
24 getting underway, could have potentially corrected that

1     problem. My XO, if he had had perhaps a better  
2     situational -- you know, better understanding of the  
3     situation awareness, could have helped preclude it. If  
4     my periscope search had been longer, if I'd taken the  
5     submarine shallower, it could have stopped, perhaps,  
6     the accident from occurring. There were a lot of what-  
7     ifs, but I'll never know. I'll never know what the key  
8     ones were. There were a lot of opportunities that --  
9     that could have changed the outcome had things been  
10    different.

11               But, did the court of inquiry, getting back  
12    to your original question, focus on the main thing? I  
13    believe a lot of information that was collected tried  
14    to pin the blame on one person and several persons, and  
15    it was frustrating for the court to not be able to do  
16    that with any clear -- clear choice of saying, "You,  
17    Petty Officer So-and-So, because you failed to do this,  
18    were the single cause of this incident. Or, you know,  
19    "You, Seacrest, because you failed to recognize the  
20    fire control system solution, computer-generated  
21    solution, had a contact solution showing the Ehime Maru  
22    had 2000 yards because you paged through it really  
23    quickly and didn't see it, you were the cause." Or,  
24    "You, McGiveny, because you as a sonar supervisor

1 didn't see whatever on your sonar display, the high  
2 bearing rate trace which should have been there were  
3 the single cause." Or, "You, Executive Officer,  
4 because you were there and didn't see it or you didn't  
5 see the CEP not maintained correctly," or, "You,  
6 ~~Cohen~~Coen, because you didn't order the ship to do the  
7 appropriate target motion analysis," or, "You, Captain,  
8 because you rushed the evolution were the single  
9 cause." It frustrated the court.

10 But what they continued to reflect back upon  
11 was this perceived artificial sense of urgency, that I  
12 rushed to get the submarine back on time. We'd already  
13 missed our arrival time at Pappa Hotel. I knew that.  
14 Was I rushing ~~Cohen~~Coen through the procedure? I chose  
15 to not follow specific things out of my standing orders  
16 because I deemed at that time them not to be necessary.

17 The contact solution, as I knew it based on the fire  
18 control information, my sonar information, my ESM  
19 reports, my own what I considered to be adequate  
20 confirmation of a visual search, which I considered to  
21 be adequate because I was well above the wave tops, I  
22 could see clearly to the horizon. I -- I scanned  
23 through the Ehime Maru, and how I missed it, to this  
24 day, I still don't know. I thought everything was --

1     was adequate.

2             If you're driving down the highway and you  
3     look in your rear view mirror and you don't see a car,  
4     and you look to your left and you don't see one, and  
5     you look to your right and you don't see one, you're on  
6     a three-lane highway, and 15 seconds later you decide  
7     to make a lane change, there are a lot of people in  
8     this world that would not turn their right turn signal  
9     indicator on and would just turn into the right lane.  
10    But my gosh, if you happen to miss that vehicle coming  
11    up from behind in a blur of speed, bam! How often have  
12    you investigated those types of things, you know?

13            I kind of view this accident as being one of  
14    those things where -- the Ehime Maru wasn't exactly  
15    coming down at a blazing rate of speed. There were  
16    just coincidental things that happened. She was on a  
17    constant bearing decreasing range, a white hull against  
18    a white haze with a narrow aspect, a quieted sound  
19    propulsion system, state-of-the-art technology variable  
20    speed propeller I think it was, with an upgraded,  
21    state-of-the-art commercial radar that had minimum lead  
22    and side lobes which, unlike the typical sloppy ship --  
23    that we see out there would tell us that we had a  
24    strong ESM signal. The -- the arrival path of the

1 sonar acoustic signature of the ship was coming in  
2 direct path instead of bottom-bounce, which is a  
3 traditional thing showing that I've got a close-to-  
4 board threat.

5 And those traditional things that we -- we  
6 normally saw just weren't there, and that's what kills  
7 me. It's that those -- those threat -- those  
8 indicators, those things that say, hey, problem. You  
9 know, if the Ehime Maru had had her fathometer on, a  
10 fish-finder, I would have said, what is this? My  
11 active intercept would have affected it. But she  
12 didn't have her fathometer on. She didn't have her  
13 fish-finder on. Gosh. Kills me, you know.

14 So, did the court of inquiry get to the root  
15 cause of the accident? I believe they did, but I  
16 believe that they clouded the issue with a lot of  
17 garbage that was unnecessary and -- and in some ways  
18 irrelevant to the -- the facts. And I wish that they  
19 had focused on, really, the main thing of what was it  
20 that the crew did, how could they have done things  
21 better, and I -- in the short period of time, I believe  
22 they did what they thought was best. Gosh knows,  
23 Admiral ~~Griffis~~Griffiths (ph) sure did for his  
24 preliminary inquiry, but his report was jaded by the



1 fact that I had a disgruntled officer, my navigator,  
2 who happened to be best friends with ~~Cohen~~Coen and  
3 didn't like seeing him in this limelight and felt that  
4 I was responsible for getting ~~Cohen~~Coen there. Start  
5 here

6 And the previous week we'd done an exercise  
7 with a trident which required us to track -- not track  
8 it but provide target services. We were the rabbit.  
9 And I had given some very clear instruction to my  
10 officer of the deck so that how I wanted him to operate  
11 the ship. And Sloane was saying, Captain, you know,  
12 cut him some slack, don't -- don't tell him what to do,  
13 let him grow, otherwise how are they going to develop?

14 And he -- Sloane was trying to help me there. But in  
15 this case, I knew we was short -- we were short on time  
16 for this exercise. We had to run these geometries with  
17 some precision and it wasn't a time to train the crew.

18 This wasn't one of those fun times, let's go down hunt  
19 down a merchant and -- and play war, you know. Target  
20 of opportunity, whatever. This was a case where I  
21 needed to make sure that we did something right. We  
22 had to do this exercise and -- and move on.

23 And so, that's why Admiral ~~Griffis~~Griffiths  
24 walked away with the impression that I was very

1 controlling, that I gave orders from my stateroom. Of  
2 course I did. I had an open mike that I listened to  
3 everything. I had a flat panel display where I could  
4 see what all the contacts were doing. I virtually had  
5 everything in my state room that I had out in control.

6 And so, if I didn't like something, rather than get up  
7 and walk out and say, Officer of the Deck, why are you  
8 doing this, I could, "aaah," buzz him with the JX and  
9 say, Officer of the Deck, talk to him privately on the  
10 phone, what are you doing, is this what you're doing?

11 Now, the crew knew that -- that is, the  
12 control room guys knew when that "aaah" buzz happened,  
13 that's the captain calling and he's only going to call  
14 the officer of the deck if he wants something. But my  
15 conversation was at least private with him. And that  
16 was, to me, a lot better than going out in front of the  
17 control room and saying, Mr. ~~Cohen~~Coen, what are you  
18 doing, turn left, don't turn right, that was dumb. I  
19 could call him on the phone and say, Mike, what are you  
20 thinking, guy's over here, this is where I want you to  
21 go, you need to -- you need to do this thing.

22 So, the command climate was kind of a red  
23 herring, too. But taken as a whole, you know, the MBT  
24 blow, the nine out of 13 people on the watch bill,

1 taking the guys down to test depth, going greater than  
2 25 naughts at this classified speed, the perception  
3 that I had unqualified guys on watch, my rushing of the  
4 OD, and this issue with command climate all helped  
5 paint a picture about me and not a very good one. You  
6 know, you may say this sounds like an alcoholic that's  
7 in denial when everyone around him is telling him,  
8 you're a boozier, you know, you're a drinker, you're an  
9 alcoholic, you're drinking, there's something wrong  
10 with you, you got a problem, and to have that alcoholic  
11 say, no, no, I don't, you know, I'm okay, I'm right,  
12 this isn't -- well, I don't want to give the impression  
13 that I'm in denial and that on that day there weren't  
14 things that went wrong. Gosh. A lot of things went  
15 wrong, and it's unfortunate because nine people died  
16 and we had a horrible collision and accident where loss  
17 of life occurred. But that wasn't the way we did  
18 business.

19 So, I'm not in denial because the ship ran  
20 wonderfully. That doesn't mean to say that we didn't  
21 have problems and we didn't have to improve on things  
22 and change things and have constant oversight. But on  
23 that day it was the complacency. The -- the thing --  
24 we're getting underway, take these visitors out to sea,

1 we're going to go show them how the submarine works,  
2 and come back in. That was the only reason the  
3 submarine went out to sea that day. No other reason.  
4 But the reason I agreed to do it is because it was more  
5 operational time. It was another reactor start-up and  
6 shutdown for my nukes that needed the training. It  
7 helped support that initiative with the upcoming  
8 engineering inspection.

9 But on that day, there was only one reason  
10 why my submarine got underway, and that was to take the  
11 visitors to sea, which I found out during the court of  
12 inquiry was indirect violation of the Secretary of the  
13 Navy instruction which said, thou shalt not go to sea.

14 I also didn't know that Brandhuber had been told by  
15 ~~Kinetsnee~~Konetzni not to go to sea either, to stay in  
16 port. But you know, Brandhuber wanted to go because  
17 this was his son-in-law -- son-in-law's last time at  
18 sea, and what a great engineer he was. Tyler Metter.  
19 And the whole thing is sad. Whole thing is sad.

20 MR. STRAUCH: The next people we're going to  
21 see are going to be people in the chain of command.

22 MR. WADDLE: Yeah.

23 MR. STRAUCH: What kinds of questions do you  
24 think we should ask them?

1                   MR. WADDLE: Well, I sent you those questions  
2 by e-mail.

3                   MR. STRAUCH: Yeah. Do you have any more you  
4 want to add to that?

5                   MR. WADDLE: Well, you know, I -- I don't  
6 know that there is anything else to ask them. But I  
7 know that the Navy is not really fond of the NTSB  
8 recommendation following the Houston collision that we  
9 use active sonar to clear the baffled areas before we  
10 go to periscope depth. Why? Because active sonar  
11 stinks. It's difficult to pull a surface contact out  
12 of background waves unless you've got quiet, you know,  
13 sea states. And let's just again call the spade a  
14 spade. Active sonar, operators are not necessary --  
15 you know, I -- seriously criticized for this because  
16 active sonar men -- excuse me, sonar men are not  
17 extremely proficient in the use of active.

18                   Now, we know what the operating restrictions  
19 are on tridents and we know that defense attack  
20 submarines and their capability to use active sonar can  
21 use it when it's deemed necessary, but the fact is, is  
22 that primary means of, you know, getting to periscope  
23 depth is by passive -- passive means. And -- and  
24 that's what I've done my whole career, and I stand by

1     that decision. So, when this accident happened, and I  
2     know that the NTSB following the Houston collision and  
3     maybe some others that said, we recommend, you know,  
4     that you employ the use of active sonar, well, the  
5     Navy's going to cringe, specifically submarine force,  
6     when they -- if they see that recommendation come up  
7     again. Why? Because I'll tell you what, guys, it's  
8     like me telling you, why don't you honk your horn six  
9     times before you do a lane change driving down the  
10    highway? Now, do you really think that's going to help  
11    you? Now, you're smiling and smirking, but you and I  
12    both know probably not.

13               What's your best sensor? Your eyes. That's  
14    a passive means of detection. Well, listening, our  
15    ears, on a sonar is really the same way, too. So, I  
16    seriously doubt that the process and procedures for  
17    getting to periscope depth have changed. But I'll tell  
18    you that the naval warfare publications are a  
19    guideline. A guideline. If the Navy was so adamant  
20    about having a submarine spend a minute and 45 seconds  
21    or three to five minutes on a leg before going to  
22    periscope depth or -- or two five-minute legs here to  
23    clear baffles, then put it in writing. If you're going  
24    to jam that in my ear and tell me that as a captain I

1       can't deviate from that, then make it a policy.

2               MR. STRAUCH: Well, if we -- if we were to  
3       ask you, was there any -- what policies in writing did  
4       you violate that day --

5               MR. WADDLE: My own policies.

6               MR. STRAUCH: Could you point to any Navy  
7       policies?

8               MR. WADDLE: No, because there weren't any.  
9       The naval warfare publications are guidelines.  
10       Recommended guidelines. My commanding officer's  
11       standing orders were orders to my crew from me saying  
12       this is what I expect. And these are standard  
13       documents that are in common use by all captains on  
14       virtually all ships. Why? Because Sub Pac has a  
15       standard set of commanding officer standing orders that  
16       they provide to each crew and usually say adopt these  
17       or modify them to conform to your ship.

18               So -- I'm trying to find an example here and  
19       I can't think of one readily that comes to mind. But I  
20       -- I put in writing my CO standing orders, and if they  
21       were my orders, then it's my prerogative to deviate  
22       from them when I deem it's appropriate to do so, and  
23       that's what I did. And that's why -- that's another  
24       thing I got jammed.

1           MR. STRAUCH: What are the rules about  
2     adhering or not adhering to your own --

3           MR. WADDLE: There aren't rules. I'm the  
4     captain, I write the rules, I can change them. And  
5     there may be a caveat in the standing orders that state  
6     a time -- I don't know that there is, but at a time --  
7     one would think that if the captain sets the rules,  
8     then he can determine when to invoke or when to modify  
9     them.

10          MR. STRAUCH: And you've done it before,  
11     presumably?

12          MR. WADDLE: Every captain has.

13          MR. STRAUCH: In the presence of people from  
14     the squadron --

15          MR. WADDLE: Any time.

16          MR. STRAUCH: And there's never -- you've  
17     never encountered --

18          MR. WADDLE: No.

19          MR. STRAUCH: -- criticism --

20          MR. WADDLE: No. Never. Can you understand  
21     that?

22          MR. STRAUCH: One of the publications that I  
23     --

24          MR. WADDLE: Now, let me tell you this. No



1 other person on board the submarine breaks my rules or  
2 broke my rules unless they said, Captain, I want to  
3 deviate from this, and I'd say, permission granted.  
4 You know, Captain, we want to keep the TDU muzzle ball  
5 valve open at this depth, we know the recommendation is  
6 that you don't do it shallower than this or deeper than  
7 that, request permission to do that. I evaluate the  
8 environment, is it okay to do this, does it first make  
9 sense to do so? If it does and it's not going to be  
10 contrary to my safety, efficiency, or backup, then,  
11 okay, permission granted for this one-time exception.  
12 Move on.

13 MR. STRAUCH: After the accident, we talked  
14 to both ~~Cohen~~Coen and Pfeifer.

15 MR. WADDLE: Mm-hmm.

16 MR. STRAUCH: ~~Cohen~~Coen brought up two  
17 incidents. He cited one in San Francisco and another  
18 one in --

19 MR. WADDLE: Where water came down the hatch?

20 MR. STRAUCH: Yeah.

21 MR. WADDLE: Yeah.

22 MR. STRAUCH: The other one where he said  
23 that you had done an emergency blow in -- to stay  
24 within your operational area --

1 MR. WADDLE: Oh, right. Yeah.

2 MR. STRAUCH: Are you familiar with those two  
3 incidents?

4 MR. WADDLE: I didn't do an emergency blow.  
5 Let's see. Did we? Yeah, we did. We did do an  
6 emergency blow.

7 MR. STRAUCH: Are you familiar with the two  
8 incidents?

9 MR. WADDLE: Oh, I sure am. And -- and in  
10 that particular case, it's another example. This was --  
11 -- the submarine was involved in an exercise where we  
12 were -- we were to be north of a Pacific latitude at --  
13 at midnight. The XO and I were back aft in the engine  
14 room monitoring an engineering drill. The drill had  
15 taken, maybe, about an hour and 15 minutes or so. It  
16 was late in the evening. And after we recovered the  
17 propulsion plan and were starting to head north,  
18 ironically, the navigator was on watch. This was Keith  
19 Sloane. And he was the officer of the deck. And we  
20 had not yet approved the chart for that -- we had not  
21 approved the next chart, you know, for the time period  
22 after midnight.

23 So, the executive officer went forward. I  
24 stayed back aft to talk to the engineer about some

1 things. And then, about a half an hour -- about 11:30  
2 at night, I walked up to the control room, and I saw  
3 the executive officer standing over the nav plot kind  
4 of doing this, looking at the -- the chart, looking at  
5 the clock, or -- or repeated -- told us what our  
6 latitude and longitude was, looking at the chart,  
7 looking at that, rubbing his brow, shaking his head.  
8 He said, we need to go faster. What's the matter? He  
9 said, we're too far south, we're not going to make it.

10 Captain Cortez, the deputy on board at that time, he  
11 was sleeping on the XO's stateroom on the bottom bunk.

12 He said, what's the matter? He said, we're -- time-  
13 distance-wise, we've got to go -- we've got to go  
14 flank, we've got to go fast right now. So, told the  
15 officer of the deck, you know, we're not going to make  
16 it to this boundary, you need to order a head flank  
17 now, start heading north.

18 So, ordered head flank, increasing speed.  
19 Request permission to exceed the submerged operating  
20 envelope. Well, that's one of the cases where the  
21 captain can grant that permission, and I did.  
22 Permission granted. I looked at it and I said, you  
23 know, we're going this speed, we need to go this far,  
24 we have to be this far north of that latitude where our

1 expansion -- fixed area of uncertainty where we operate  
2 has to be clear by a buffer, we're not going to make  
3 it. What time is it? And we had less than, I think,  
4 10 minutes or so, maybe eight minutes to -- to get to  
5 the surface. Otherwise, we'd be what's called out of  
6 area, in water that we didn't know, submerged, and a  
7 potential collision with someone else we didn't know.

8           So, I -- I walked to con and I said,  
9 Navigator, I relieve you of the deck and the con. He  
10 said, I stand relieved. Said, you know, Diving  
11 Officer, rig ship for large rotor angles. Helm, all  
12 ahead -- I think we slowed, I can't remember, came  
13 shallow, and I told sonar to prepare to conduct a  
14 baffle clear maneuver to the right. And so, at a high  
15 speed we -- we came up to the normal depth that we  
16 clear baffles, slowed the ship to 15 naughts, and then  
17 started this turn. And as we steadied after we cleared  
18 our -- our baffles at 120 degrees, I gave the order,  
19 all stations prepare to proceed to periscope depth and  
20 said, you know, to the diving officer -- can't remember  
21 if he said, ship conducting a 10-second emergency blow,  
22 but we were actually ticking down the seconds, and we  
23 were, like, two minutes now, maybe even a minute away  
24 from midnight. And I said, Officer of the Deck -- I

1     said, Diving Officer or Chief of the Watch, initiate a  
2     10-second emergency blow, and so we did a 10-second  
3     emergency blow and the ship broached right to the  
4     surface right at midnight and we were on the surface,  
5     turned and headed north.

6             And the problem there is I had the navigator  
7     who was on watch who didn't know where the ship was.  
8     My assistant navigator was -- he may have been the  
9     quartermaster of the watch. The chief is now a senior  
10    chief on the Sub Pac staff. If you need more details  
11    about that, you can talk to him, and I forgot his last  
12    name. But I then had to go in and tell Captain Cortez,  
13    we almost had an out-of-area incident because of this  
14    situation where the chart wasn't, you know, reviewed in  
15    time and my officer of the deck forgot his  
16    requirements. And that's that story.

17            The other one you said that ~~Cohen~~Coen talked  
18    about was, oh, water coming -- the court of inquiry  
19    addressed that, too, but then they -- they said it's  
20    irrelevant. There's a place west of the Golden Gate  
21    Bridge called the Potato Patch where waves -- you get  
22    some of these real waves that come in. And we were  
23    motoring through and I had Tyler Metter, my officer of  
24    the deck, on the bridge. I was trying to get him down

1 quickly because I saw these large waves and we were  
2 going to -- we were taking water and spray over the top  
3 of the sail. And it's customary that submarines have  
4 their bridges rigged for dive before going under the  
5 Golden Gate Bridge, and it just took Metter longer than  
6 normal. And we took about 400 gallons of water down  
7 that bridge hatch, and that's -- that's what CohenCoen  
8 was referring to.

9 So, the transit back from San Francisco to  
10 Pearl Harbor, we spent time chasing down grounds on  
11 some of our electrical systems and doing a lot of  
12 cleanup work -- salt deposits had entered a lot of  
13 gear. But again, two unrelated things.

14 But his -- perhaps CohenCoen's -- I would --  
15 I would question his discussion to try to bring those  
16 in unless it was to say, well, here's two other things  
17 that happened. I could tell you more and say I was  
18 getting ready to moor the submarine and I had a  
19 lieutenant named Matt Dragg off the USS -- it was Willy  
20 Helardes's submarine. I forgot his command -- that he  
21 had, the boat's name escaped me right now. It doesn't  
22 matter.

23 But we were coming in and a pilot is pushing  
24 me at a diagonal, parallel to the pier but kind of at a

1 -- at a diagonal angle coming back, and I've got the  
2 Cheyenne parked dead astern of me pointing the other  
3 way, and the pilot almost ran my -- my submarine, my  
4 stern into that boat's stern. If I hadn't ordered  
5 ahead two-thirds and had a -- that operated quickly, we  
6 would have had a collision two submarines, one parked,  
7 one trying to park, and taken two 688-Is out. You  
8 know, it would have been ridiculous. But again, that's  
9 part of there by the grace of God go I. The near-miss,  
10 the -- the actions that individuals take.

11 Countless other events I could tell you that  
12 have occurred, you know, throughout my career. But why  
13 those would have some bearing or relevance to  
14 ~~Cohen~~Coen's testimony to the NTSB, I don't know other  
15 than to say that I don't know what he was trying to  
16 discuss there.

17 MR. STRAUCH: What about the incidents that  
18 happened to the Greenville after -- after you were  
19 relieved of command?

20 MR. WADDLE: My opinion is, is that the Navy  
21 made a bad decision, and that decision was to not send  
22 me back to command because of whatever political  
23 pressures may have existed. The Ogden captain has  
24 subsequently been relieved. Did you know that? That

1 was in the press -- that was the press a couple days  
2 ago.

3 So, Dave Bogden was relieved because the  
4 submarine bottomed off of Saipan. Again, what's the  
5 common denominator there? Keith Sloane, the navigator.

6 Didn't have the right chart, had done an inadequate  
7 preparation review, and same thing with Jerry Pfeifer.  
8 And I hate to say it, but you know, those two guys --  
9 Pfeifer knew his career was over, Sloane probably  
10 thought, hey, I'm screwed too, you know, I've got this  
11 Greenville name associated with me, kind of like  
12 probably every former employee that's worked for Enron  
13 that puts Enron on their resume. Kind of look at that  
14 as a scarlet letter.

15 But the fact is, is that Bogden, new in  
16 command, had not had the time to foster what I consider  
17 to be a solid working relationship with his crew and  
18 was forced to take a boat out in deployment. I believe  
19 it was a bad decision. And the Navy -- I can tell you  
20 it's a bad decision because look what happened, so.

21 MR. STRAUCH: Who made that decision?

22 MR. WADDLE: I can't tell you.

23 MR. STRAUCH: Would it have been a squadron-  
24 level --



1           MR. WADDLE: No, no, much higher. The fact  
2 that an officer is fired has made it the Sub Pac level.  
3 But -- but that admiral -- and that was  
4 ~~Kinetsnee~~Konetzni at the time -- didn't make that  
5 decision without discussing this with the other senior  
6 leadership, that is probably Admiral Gibastiani (ph),  
7 who is at Sub Lant, or Admiral Skip Bowman, who is the  
8 head of Naval Reactors, Department of Energy. I'm sure  
9 that as a courtesy call they -- he called the admiral  
10 to say, this is what's happening. And because of my  
11 collision, both of those guys would have fully  
12 understood. You don't have a collision and kill nine  
13 people and not fire the captain.

14           But that's in today's Asian environment. So,  
15 Bogden with his bottoming off of Saipan and, sure, he's  
16 at fault because in his check he should have recognized  
17 that they didn't have the most up-to-date chart. A lot  
18 of people should have caught it. The assistant  
19 navigator should have, the -- first of all, the  
20 executive officer in his review should have found it.  
21 The navigator should have found it in his review. The  
22 assistant navigator as well, including the  
23 quartermaster that prepared the chart. There are at  
24 least, you know, five people there that could have

1 precluded that event from happening.

2 But then, this next event where the submarine  
3 had a collision with the amphibious ship Ogden in the  
4 Persian Gulf, I wasn't there, I don't know the details,  
5 I haven't talked to anybody, but I was told that the  
6 Ogden -- and the story I was told kind of makes sense  
7 because the Ogden's CO was fired -- that the Ogden was  
8 supposed to take station on the Greenville. Well, if  
9 the seas were rough and the Ogden was going to provide  
10 a lead for the Greenville -- and I'm only speculating  
11 because I don't know the information. Somehow the  
12 stern of the Greenville managed to slip underneath that  
13 of the Ogden, come up underneath, and the vertical  
14 stabilizer, kind of like a vertical fin on the end of a  
15 airplane wing on some of our larger jets, impacted the  
16 under -- underbelly of the Ogden and punched an eight-  
17 inch by 15-inch hole, or however big it was, and  
18 spilled thousands of gallons of fuel into the ocean.  
19 So the Ogden CO gets fired. Sad story, you know.

20 I guarantee you there were a lot of people  
21 that were up there that -- that could have seen that  
22 happening. The captain of the Greenville could have  
23 had his outboard operating and pointed in the opposite  
24 direction, which could have turned his stern away. But

1     then again, with wind blowing and sea state and a lot  
2     of things, and not knowing what happened, you know,  
3     that outboard could have been ineffective. But another  
4     sad story.

5             So, that's two careers of two commanding  
6     officers, one surface, one submariner, that were  
7     destroyed because of that. And the questionable  
8     outcome of the guy that's serving in command right now  
9     as well, but you know what? That's too bad. That's --  
10    that's another sad story.

11            MR. STRAUCH: There have been discussions,  
12    and this came up in the court of inquiry, about the two  
13    cultures in submarines, the -- the reaction culture  
14    versus the operational culture.

15            MR. WADDLE: We didn't have a split. No,  
16    everybody -- that didn't exist in our crew. The --  
17    they're called nukes and coners. You know, coners are  
18    these guys up fore or engineering guys back aft, and we  
19    didn't have fore-aft split. We worked together as a  
20    team. The guys worked very well.

21            MR. STRAUCH: Your background was reactors?

22            MR. WADDLE: Engineering, yeah. All -- the  
23    majority of every -- every captain has specialty  
24    background in engineering because it's drilled in us.

1 We're -- we're qualified as engineers first. You go  
2 through the engineering training pipeline first before  
3 you go to command -- not command, but your initial tour  
4 as a junior officer. You go through six months of  
5 intense curriculum training. That's six months of a  
6 prototype operation and three months of sub school, and  
7 then you go to your first boat. You qualify usually in  
8 engineering first before you move forward to qualify as  
9 an officer of the deck.

10 So, the emphasis is primarily on engineering,  
11 and I'll tell you that most guys don't really learn how  
12 to drive the ship until the latter part of their junior  
13 officer tour, or more importantly, until they get to  
14 become department heads. And that's true for me and  
15 that's the same for virtually every other officer  
16 that's out there.

17 MR. STRAUCH: One of the articles that we  
18 read from the Naval Institute proceeding --

19 MR. WADDLE: Stop a second.

20 (Pause)

21 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. After a brief break,  
22 we're back on the record.

23 MR. STRAUCH: Do you want to take a break or  
24 anything?

1 MR. WADDLE: No. We just took one.

2 MR. STRAUCH: Okay. You're all set?

3 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Barry, it's my recollection  
4 you -- your last question involved the Naval Institute  
5 proceedings --

6 MR. STRAUCH: Yeah.

7 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: -- article.

8 MR. STRAUCH: Have you read any of the  
9 articles in the --

10 MR. WADDLE: I don't read anything. I don't  
11 read "Navy Times," "Naval Institute Proceedings." I  
12 don't care to read anything. But if you've got an  
13 article, I'll gladly scan it and review it.

14 MR. STRAUCH: Okay. Well, this is from the  
15 July 2001 issue, written by Paul Troy Wright.

16 MR. WADDLE: Sure.

17 MR. STRAUCH: And he said that, "A review of  
18 Commander Waddle's career path suggests that there has  
19 been no end to and perhaps there has been -- even been  
20 an escalation of a culture war that raged within the  
21 submarine force since before my time, almost two  
22 decades ago, that clash between those who believe that  
23 a submarine officer's operational competence is the  
24 foundation of his professional skills and others who

1 believe that the foundation is engineering competence."

2 And he goes on to say that your -- according  
3 to your official biography, your first sea tour was  
4 with a pre-commissioning unit of the Alabama --

5 MR. WADDLE: I know where you're getting to  
6 this. He's -- he's questioning the amount of time that  
7 I had at sea and whether or not I was fully qualified  
8 to operate the ship.

9 MR. STRAUCH: Yeah.

10 MR. WADDLE: Yeah, I was fully qualified. I  
11 wouldn't have been in command if I wasn't. There's no  
12 foundation for that. But I'll tell you that -- I don't  
13 know who this guy is. What's his retired rank? I'm  
14 not sure what makes him --

15 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Should be at the bottom of  
16 the --

17 MR. WADDLE: It'll be in the back of the  
18 article.

19 MR. STRAUCH: He didn't retire. He was --  
20 let me see --

21 (Pause)

22 MR. WADDLE: Okay. By Paul Troy Wright.  
23 Wright graduated from the Naval Academy in '79. He  
24 served on Fast Attack Submarine Ray from April through

1 '84. After leaving the Navy -- he -- he's practiced  
2 law for 15 years. Well, you know what? Mr. Wright,  
3 you're no expert.

4 (Laughter)

5 MR. WADDLE: You have five years in the Navy  
6 and you don't know jack and you don't know shit and  
7 together, you don't know jack shit, so. You know,  
8 that's just -- that's my response.

9 MRS. WADDLE: But he got his article printed.

10 MR. WADDLE: But he got his article printed,  
11 but he brings up what I consider to be a valid point,  
12 and that point is, is that, as I alluded to earlier,  
13 that officers are trained to be engineers first and  
14 tacticians second. And if you look at the Royal Navy,  
15 they have -- professional engineers and then they have  
16 professional tacticians. They have those that dedicate  
17 their lives to being in engineering and those that  
18 dedicate their lives to be the ship drivers, operation  
19 guys up forward. Does that warrant a review of our  
20 cultural change? It could.

21 But the bottom line is, is that you do your  
22 time back aft so you understand what's happening in the  
23 engine room. You come forward and then you learn how  
24 to drive the ship, and you drive the ship forward as an

1 officer of the deck. So then, when the engineer calls  
2 forward with a casualty report, you understand full  
3 well what's happening back in that engine room, or at  
4 least you should. That's -- that's not to say that,  
5 you know, we've got officers that come from ballistic  
6 missile submarines to fast attack submarines and they  
7 don't fully understand the -- the intricacies of the  
8 plant back aft as well as a junior officer who  
9 qualified as engineering officer on his first boat, and  
10 there's no question.

11 Now, maybe the Navy needs to -- needs to  
12 review perhaps our practices of -- of keeping, you  
13 know, those that -- I don't know. That's irrelevant to  
14 this. But the fact is, is that, again, the Navy's  
15 responsible for ensuring that men are properly trained  
16 and have the skill sets required to operate the ships.

17 And as such, I was fully qualified and fully capable  
18 of operating the Greenville. I understood how to  
19 operate it tactically and could drive the boat, so.

20 Paul Troy Wright here states that my career  
21 was founded on engineering excellence and competence.  
22 That's true. I excelled in the engineering area. And  
23 I also was a good ship driver. On that day, I wasn't a  
24 good ship driver.



1           So, there's not a lot of supporting  
2 information here on his article, but I understand where  
3 you're going with it. And I would say that, certainly,  
4 the Navy needs to make sure that the best qualified men  
5 are assigned to submarines that need the help the most.

6       And right now, the Greenville needs a strong captain  
7 that can take care of its people, that is also  
8 tactically savvy and engineering strong, and can  
9 rebuild that organization because right now morale is  
10 about -- is deep in the dirt as you can get with the  
11 commanding officer that's serving that doesn't trust  
12 his crew and a crew that doesn't trust him.

13           And that's the corporate culture right now.  
14 Why? Because guys that serve on the ship right now  
15 have called me to share that information with me. And  
16 they just got back from deployment, a seven-month  
17 deployment, a week or so ago. And I still talk to the  
18 men on the ship, but unfortunately, you know, I'm not  
19 there. I'm not part of that anymore. I can't fix  
20 that. It's not my problem now. But I still have an  
21 allegiance to the men that I served with that I  
22 consider to be an extension of my family that I will  
23 help in any way that I possibly can.

24           Anything else you wanted to ask about this?

1           MR. STRAUCH: Not about this, but -- another  
2 article.

3           MR. WADDLE: Sure.

4           MR. STRAUCH: John Byron -- signed Captain  
5 John Byron, Retired, so he --

6           MR. WADDLE: Okay.

7           MR. STRAUCH: -- he was a captain.

8           MR. WADDLE: Right.

9           MR. STRAUCH: And I'd ask --

10          MR. WADDLE: Former submariner?

11          MR. STRAUCH: Yes.

12          MR. WADDLE: Okay.

13          MR. STRAUCH: He retired, I think, in '93.

14          MR. WADDLE: All right.

15          MR. STRAUCH: Not on -- (inaudible) -- he  
16 didn't serve on --

17          MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Mostly diesel boats.

18          MR. WADDLE: Well, he would have -- all  
19 right.

20          MR. ROTH-ROFFY: I played with his -- his  
21 background.

22          MR. WADDLE: What's your question there?

23          MR. STRAUCH: Well, what he -- what he argues  
24 is that the home port squadron commander has it in his

1 best interest to certify one of his squadron's vessels  
2 as okay even though it may not be and that he may not  
3 necessarily give it the kind of oversight that he --  
4 that it should get because it may make him look bad if  
5 he were to --

6 MR. WADDLE: Not give them a passing mark?

7 MR. STRAUCH: Yeah. Is that --

8 MR. WADDLE: Okay.

9 MR. STRAUCH: -- do you think that's a fair  
10 assessment of what Byron said?

11 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Yes.

12 MR. WADDLE: That's -- that's not uncommon.

13 MR. STRAUCH: Is there any way that -- that  
14 --

15 MR. WADDLE: Do you think INS would want to  
16 make a report to the president and say that our  
17 administrative process internally is not very good and  
18 we're able to issue visas -- student visas to al Qaeda  
19 members or known terrorists? I bet they sure wish that  
20 they had done that before it became public knowledge  
21 yesterday and had the president read it on the front  
22 page of the paper.

23 But I'd say that, you know, there's things  
24 that you want to fix internally, and as a captain, I

1     was no different. If I had a problem on my ship, I  
2     would -- and I found it, I'd say, oh my goodness, go  
3     fix that. But see, I was different. I'd pick up the  
4     phone and call my squadron commander and say, hey,  
5     Commodore, I just found this, we had this problem, it's  
6     fixed, I want you to know it's fixed, but I want you to  
7     know that we had a problem and this is what I found.  
8     And why would I do that? So he could share that  
9     information with my peers and the squadron and make  
10    sure that those same types of issues didn't exist.

11             Now, this particular individual, "Are  
12    Subcommanders Scapegoats?", the home port submarine  
13    squadron -- I'm quoting from a paragraph on the second  
14    of five pages, "The home port submarine squadron is the  
15    other primary player in these sad dramas at sea. With  
16    a better approach to the squadron's role in training  
17    and testing deploying ships, the Navy can find the  
18    solutions that have been missed and end the carnage in  
19    a wardroom such as the Greenville."

20             Now, was he inferring that I had a poor  
21    command climate?

22             MR. STRAUCH: No.

23             MR. ROTH-ROFFY: No, I believe the inference  
24    was that the squadron was not really overseeing the

1 vessel properly and was not actively involved in -- in  
2 the oversight of the tactical or the operational  
3 aspects.

4 MR. WADDLE: Well, I could say that that was  
5 true. And then, I could also say that to some extent,  
6 you know, Sub Pac had the same problem. Otherwise, the  
7 USS Los Angeles wouldn't have fired -- they wouldn't  
8 have had their captain, Mark Jenkins, fired almost a  
9 year before or half -- six months I guess it was before  
10 my incident because he took like 22 guys to captain's  
11 mast. The problem there was that the -- that  
12 submarine, the Los Angeles, didn't have the adequate  
13 senior enlisted leadership that it needed. It didn't  
14 have the chief petty officers in place to help run the  
15 submarine, and they were relying upon first class petty  
16 officers and others to carry the load. And then the  
17 captain, I believe, you know, could have done business  
18 a little bit different and been more of a coach and a  
19 teacher instead of a tyrant.

20 But I know Mark Jenkins. He's a close  
21 personal friend of mine. I'm sure he was frustrated at  
22 the fact that his men were doing some stupid things,  
23 and so he did what he thought was best. And that is,  
24 take them before captain's mast and fine them, punish

1       them, reduce them in rank, whatever.

2               In this case, I made it clear on the other  
3       side of your tape here that my squadron commander,  
4       Captain Rich Snead, had spent no time on board my sub  
5       in his -- in his short months as commander of Submarine  
6       Squadron One. Why? Because he felt it wasn't  
7       necessary. I was keeping him apprised of my -- my  
8       progress. I met with him in private. I talked to him  
9       openly about my problems. I didn't hide anything. He  
10      didn't think there was any reason for me to hide  
11      anything. He trusted everything I told him. I just  
12      wanted him down on the ship so my crew could see him.

13             Now, his deputies were there and they knew  
14      how the Greenville did business. And the bottom line  
15      was, if someone had something that was screwed up on  
16      their ship, whether it was inability to clean something  
17      or they needed instruction notice or procedure, go to  
18      the Greenville and get it because they know how to do  
19      it and they do it right.

20             So, it's always good to be on top, to be the  
21      -- the lead dog. But Lord help you when something goes  
22      wrong because, you know, then that spotlight gets back  
23      on top of you real quick. And that's what happened to  
24      us. Spotlight shifted on us, on the Greenville that

1 day because of a horrible, tragic accident. But had we  
2 come to -- had we come back into port as scheduled  
3 without that event occurring, the civilians would have  
4 gone off, my wife and I would have had a wonderful  
5 romantic dinner as we'd planned that night, we would  
6 have enjoyed the weekend, passed our engineering  
7 inspection. I would have completed my command tour  
8 more than likely and moved on.

9 MRS. WADDLE: You'd still be in Hawaii.

10 MR. WADDLE: Still be in Hawaii. But you  
11 know, the -- the article here talks about -- I haven't  
12 had the chance to read it. Maybe we can take a break  
13 and I can scan through it, but it -- it looks like it  
14 highlights the issue of the submarine trying to get  
15 into Saipan here where it had the grounding. And it  
16 has a little bit more detail -- I can't speak about  
17 this article, but --

18 MR. STRAUCH: Did you want to take a break?

19 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Let's go ahead and just take  
20 a couple-minute break.

21 MR. WADDLE: -- yeah.

22 (Pause)

23 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. We're back on the  
24 record after a brief break.

1           MR. STRAUCH: Could you comment on it, on his  
2 points?

3           MR. WADDLE: Right. We're reviewing -- or,  
4 I'm commenting on the article written by Captain John  
5 Byron, U.S. Navy retired, "Are Subcommanders  
6 Scapegoats?", in that -- and this is a -- this is a  
7 good question to pose for the men that you're about to  
8 interview next week, and I'll -- I'll let them answer  
9 it. But I would certainly say that it's true -- I will  
10 confirm that it's true that the squadron staffs are  
11 burdened with the requirement to provide oversight for  
12 the material readiness of the -- of the vessels. And  
13 too often, they don't get the time or the focus on the  
14 important issues of tactics and operational readiness.  
15 You know, each person has his -- his own agenda, his -  
16 - you know, the engineers have to focus on engineering,  
17 the operations guys have to focus on ops. That makes  
18 sense. But the engineering guys also are there to  
19 focus on maintenance material concerns. And with the  
20 too few number of squadron deputies that exist where  
21 there's maybe one or two, it -- and there's, maybe,  
22 five or six submarines in the squadron, and one deputy  
23 is out riding a submarine for -- for training and  
24 proficiency and evaluation, that doesn't leave much



1 back on the staff to help you. So I'd say the staffs  
2 are undermanned. That's a significant issue and  
3 concern.

4 The staffs are so undermanned to the point  
5 where they can't do their jobs effectively. It isn't  
6 helping all those boats in their squadron. Others  
7 could debate that, but that's open for discussion.  
8 That's one man's opinion.

9 But this issue of accountability I think is  
10 interesting, too. Why did I stand tall and say that  
11 I'm accountable, I'm responsible for my actions,  
12 because I was the captain. I didn't see anybody else  
13 senior to me standing tall taking any kind of  
14 responsibility or accountability for their actions.  
15 But I know that when I did, when I stood as captain to  
16 say I'm responsible, I'm accountable, my men fell in  
17 behind me. Not -- not a one denied his responsibility  
18 or his shortcomings that ever took the stand, including  
19 Patrick Seacrest, fire control technician. Mike  
20 ~~Cohen~~Coen read a statement. Jerry Pfeifer submitted a  
21 written statement. You know, they could have done it a  
22 little bit more, but they did what they thought they  
23 had to do, just like I did what I thought I had to do.

24 MR. STRAUCH: Who above you should have --

1 (End of Tape 1, Side B)

2 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. This is resuming the  
3 interview. We're on Tape 2.

4 Barry, could you restate that question?

5 MR. STRAUCH: The question was -- I asked  
6 Scott Waddle who above him would he have liked to have  
7 seen stand tall, and the answer was that that would be  
8 a good question for --

9 MR. WADDLE: The commodores. And -- but I  
10 think that it's kind of obvious. Dave Warner, who took  
11 the stand as the public affairs officer, frustrated the  
12 court of inquiry because he could never answer a  
13 question with a straight answer. He made Admiral --  
14 (inaudible) -- mad. But I would have liked to have  
15 seen Admiral ~~Kinetsnee~~Konetzni stand tall and say that,  
16 you know, I'm responsible to some degree for the -- for  
17 having the civilians there, for -- my commodore saying,  
18 yeah, I was accountable, I was responsible for allowing  
19 the submarine to get underway with no other purpose  
20 than just a DV cruise. But you know, at the time I  
21 don't think anybody really knew about that Secretary of  
22 the Navy instruction that said, you will not get  
23 underway for the sole purpose of taking visitors to  
24 sea.

1 MR. STRAUCH: Had that ever happened before?

2 MR. WADDLE: Sure. Lots of times.

3 MR. STRAUCH: Taking DVs --

4 MR. WADDLE: Yeah.

5 MR. STRAUCH: -- on board exclusively for the  
6 purpose --

7 MR. WADDLE: Sure.

8 MR. STRAUCH: -- of a cruise?

9 MR. WADDLE: And I'd volunteered to do so  
10 because, again, as I said earlier, I knew that it was a  
11 reactor start-up and a shutdown, it was a training  
12 evolution for my crew. Any time I could get my ship to  
13 sea, I would do so.

14 MR. STRAUCH: You mentioned Admiral  
15 ~~Kinetsnee~~Konetzni and the public affairs officer.  
16 Anybody else?

17 MR. WADDLE: I said the squadron commander,  
18 you know, Rich Snead, who was there at the time.

19 MR. STRAUCH: And why should he have -- what  
20 should he have acknowledged?

21 MR. WADDLE: Well, I mean, where was my  
22 squadron commander in the decision process for allowing  
23 me to go to sea? I can tell you that it was clear to  
24 me that the type commander, that is Admiral

1 ~~Kinetsnee~~Konetzni's staff, certainly was trying to pin  
2 the blame on the squadron commander saying that it was  
3 their fault, they were the ones that allowed this to  
4 happen, and they should have provided the oversight to  
5 keep the Greenville from going to sea. Come on.  
6 Someone should have said, the reason the submarine went  
7 to sea is because we wanted to get these guests out  
8 there.

9           And Rowena Rowe, who's in -- the civilian at  
10 the public affairs office, was the one that picked up  
11 the phone and made the call and said, Commander Waddle,  
12 will you guys -- will you do this, can you do this?  
13 Sure, Rowe, I can, you know I can, I love doing this, I  
14 love taking guys to sea. I did. It's a thrill to take  
15 guests to sea. I see the excitement in their eyes. It  
16 was really cool. It was a great thing. Still is, and  
17 I still believe it's an important part of our business.

18       But unfortunately, taking guests to sea has become --  
19 has begun kind of -- become kind of a marketing  
20 initiative because we've got to tell our story, tell  
21 our tale. Doggone it, you know, we're warships and  
22 perhaps the Navy needs to find better lobbyists to get  
23 before Congress and what not to raise the funds that  
24 are required to buy more.

1           But I can remember talking to Captain Snead  
2     one day when he actually came to visit, one of the two  
3     times, at the shipyard. And I said, what's our  
4     mission, what do I tell our guys, you know, what our  
5     mission is. Scott, the mission right today is to  
6     survive. Protect these national treasures and survive.

7     Survival meant not hitting your ship, not damaging it,  
8     not losing money. It kills me to know that \$100  
9     million was -- or however much money was spent in the  
10    recovery efforts of the Ehime Maru when that money  
11    could have been directed towards improving the quality  
12    of life of sailors and men and women in uniform or some  
13    other beneficial thing.

14           MR. STRAUCH: You said that this was a  
15    warship. How would that play a part in the DV cruises?

16           MR. WADDLE: A warship?

17           MR. STRAUCH: Yeah. This was a warship, and  
18    I guess the implication therefore is, was there  
19    anything inappropriate about using a warship to conduct  
20    DV cruises for what are essentially marketing tours?

21           MR. WADDLE: No different than putting people  
22    -- flying people to carriers and letting them watch  
23    aircraft flight operations or putting a reporter in the  
24    back seat of a F14 Tomcat. As you and I know,

1 television celebrities that -- or newscasters that get  
2 in the back of jets and break the sound barrier, and  
3 they get that -- it's -- it's PR. It's exposure.

4 MRS. WADDLE: Movies.

5 MR. WADDLE: Movies like "Top Gun" or  
6 "Crimson Tide" or "Black Hawk Down." Why do you think  
7 the military supports those types of movies that  
8 portray a positive image? Because they're great  
9 recruiting tools and it is information for the American  
10 public that helps justify the existence of the  
11 organization.

12 MR. STRAUCH: Was there anything different  
13 about this particular cruise other than -- other than  
14 the event itself: the number of visitors, the nature  
15 of the --

16 MR. WADDLE: Sure. Admiral Mackey, I found  
17 out on Wednesday before the Friday underway, wasn't  
18 going to go to sea. Or maybe it's Tuesday. That was a  
19 big disappointment. Not really because I didn't know  
20 the man.

21 The greatest disappointment was finding out  
22 that Admiral ~~Kinetsnee~~Konetzni wasn't going to be there  
23 at all. I found that out Wednesday when I went to the  
24 PAO office and spoke with Rowena so I could get

1 biography information on the individuals coming to my  
2 ship. Because here's my chance to show off, again, my  
3 boat, one last hurrah before ~~Kinetsnee~~Konetzni left.  
4 And I wanted the biography of the individuals coming  
5 because I'd like to know something about their  
6 background before they came on the ship. The way it  
7 works.

8           Was this group different? Sure, it was a  
9 group of Texans, and I agreed to do the -- the DV  
10 cruise once I found out Admiral Mackey wasn't going and  
11 ~~Kinetsnee~~Konetzni wasn't going because I had agreed to  
12 do so and they had already made the trip and were on  
13 island at that time.

14           MR. STRAUCH: And you're from Texas?

15           MR. WADDLE: I am.

16           MR. STRAUCH: Did that play a part? They --  
17 you said they were Texans.

18           MR. WADDLE: Sure.

19           MRS. WADDLE: You didn't know that --

20           MR. WADDLE: I didn't know it until I found  
21 out that Wednesday. Then it was just something -- I  
22 wanted to do something a little bit special for them,  
23 so I went to the -- this flag shop downtown and bought  
24 little Tennessee state flags, Navy flags, and Texas

1 state flags, and I bought one from -- for Brandhuber  
2 from Ohio because I thought that's where Perdue was.  
3 Dummy. Now I know differently. Dumb son-in-law told  
4 me that he was from Ohio. Bought the wrong state flag.

5 But anyway, I just wanted to make it  
6 memorable. I wanted it to be special for -- for the  
7 group. I wanted the table decoration to look good. I  
8 wasn't trying to be a Martha Stewart, but I wanted this  
9 to be just like if you were invited on board my sub.  
10 I'd want it to be special for you. I'd want you to go  
11 away with the impression -- the confidence to know that  
12 the men that were serving in their capacity as sailors  
13 were doing a good job and protecting our country and  
14 that we had fully qualified, highly skilled, trained  
15 individuals out there. That's what made me so proud,  
16 because that's what's serving out there today.

17 MR. STRAUCH: What about the number of  
18 visitors? Have you had that -- that number before?

19 MR. WADDLE: I'd had more before. We --  
20 heck, we've had families of my crew members out there.  
21 Twice -- three times that many out there at sea.

22 MR. STRAUCH: When you took those families  
23 out in the increased numbers, did you -- did you have  
24 the same number of people in the control room as you



1 had --

2 MR. WADDLE: More. More.

3 MR. STRAUCH: But on this cruise, they seemed  
4 to have gotten in the way, at least to Seacrest?

5 MR. WADDLE: Because they were all up front.

6 And yes, they were in the way, but Patrick Seacrest  
7 could have said, excuse me, I need to get to my plot,  
8 but he chose not to do so. And when they were in my  
9 way and I couldn't see something, I said, excuse me,  
10 would you move forward, would you move back, and they  
11 accommodated me. They weren't in the way.

12 MR. STRAUCH: And if they were in the way,  
13 you could have done something about it?

14 MR. WADDLE: I did do something about it.

15 MR. STRAUCH: What's the most number of  
16 visitors you've ever had in the control room?

17 MR. WADDLE: I don't know.

18 MR. STRAUCH: You've had -- you have had more  
19 than --

20 MR. WADDLE: We've had more. But I can't --  
21 I can't tell you the number. I don't remember. But  
22 that's -- you know, when families were there. Not so  
23 many to the point that we couldn't do our job, but I've  
24 had as many, it not more, in there before, and I'm sure

1 as other captains and crews have, too, with -- with  
2 family members.

3 Now, I can remember Admiral Paget during my  
4 PCO -- prospective commanding officer training pipeline  
5 when he was the commander of Submarine Group 2 in  
6 Connecticut saying, I don't like V -- DV -- I don't  
7 like family cruises, I don't allow them here in  
8 Connecticut, and I'm sure that with him being the force  
9 commander in Pearl, they probably don't have family  
10 cruises now where, you know, you take your family to  
11 sea, usually drive to Maui. They get off on a small  
12 boat and then fly back or some come back -- come back  
13 the same day or two days later from the -- visit.

14 But, if the point is to what degree did the  
15 -- did the civilians impact operations on that day,  
16 I'll say that there was some. Their -- their sheer  
17 presence alone was kind of like gnawing in the back of  
18 your brain. Gotta get the folks back, we've got to get  
19 the submarine back to port, we need to get -- they've  
20 got an agenda to maintain, so let's get back and get  
21 this over with.

22 The fact that they were standing kind of in  
23 the way caused a reaction from one of my sailors, so he  
24 says to -- to not -- former crew members to -- to say,

1     you know, I chose not to update that because, well, it  
2     was too hard, they were in the way. That's an excuse.

3     But you know, that could have been him that day. He  
4     could say, well then, yes, they had an impact.

5             So, for me to say no, no, no, clearly the  
6     civilians had no impact whatsoever, yes, they have an  
7     impact. They had an impact by their sheer presence on  
8     the ship because it's not normal, it's different.

9             MR. STRAUCH: Did you do anything differently  
10    with the family cruises than with this cruise?

11            MR. WADDLE: Yeah, I didn't do an emergency  
12    blow.

13            MR. STRAUCH: You're saying that --

14            MR. WADDLE: Did the angles and dangles, did  
15    high-speed turns. I don't remember going to that test  
16    depth, but you know, I think -- I think we -- we went  
17    deep. I'm not sure -- I don't remember how deep we  
18    went. Have to look at the records. But let's say that  
19    what I did for the DVs that day was exactly what I did  
20    for the VIPs that I embarked when James Cameron,  
21    Director James Cameron, and the Santa Barbara Navy  
22    League, when I picked them up in San Diego in July of  
23    1999. July '99? July of 2000. My dates are confused.

24            MRS. WADDLE: I don't know. I don't --

1           MR. WADDLE: July of 2000. July of 2000. My  
2 point is, is that I didn't do anything special for this  
3 group of Texan -- Texans than I did for I want to say -  
4 - Jack Spencer was his name, I think, from the  
5 thinktank in D.C. One man that I took to sea that day.  
6 One man, one man. Because he was from a thinktank and  
7 I knew it was important to Admiral ~~Kinetsnee~~Konetzni.  
8 He had no one else to go, and I volunteered. I said,  
9 hey, look, I'm in my commanding officer discretionary  
10 time, I'm in port, I can get -- I can get underway.  
11 And so, I chose to get the submarine underway, but that  
12 was my decision. I was in port, it was my  
13 discretionary time, I could go to sea.

14           And see, a sea lawyer could use that very  
15 same excuse and say, well, Commander Waddle said he  
16 wanted to go to sea to train his crew that day, and so  
17 we saw an opportunity and it fit so we actually put the  
18 civilians on board because it was the smart thing to  
19 do. That was my discretionary time to either stay in  
20 port or take my submarine to sea.

21           Well, yeah, you know what? I chose to do  
22 that. I took the ship to sea, and I'd hate to see that  
23 as an excuse. Oh, well, Secretary of the Navy's  
24 instructions said you can't do that, that's the only

1 reason why I went to sea that day, clearly not my  
2 problem. I'm not saying that, you know. But I'm just  
3 saying that if -- if there was no other reason for me  
4 to go to sea that day other than take visitors, it  
5 would have been nice to have someone say, you know, we  
6 let that happen, we shouldn't have, and that was wrong.

7 MR. STRAUCH: One of the things that that  
8 brings up is apparently they weren't aware of the  
9 Secretary of the Navy's directive not to have --

10 MR. WADDLE: I don't think a lot of people  
11 were until later. But I don't think that has any  
12 bearing or relevance on the accident. Again, it's one  
13 of those red herrings. Separate thing for an  
14 investigation if you want to have one. But it has no  
15 -- no real bearing on the accident other than the  
16 fact that, you know, I only went to sea that day for  
17 one reason. That was to take the guests.

18 So, focus on what's important. What  
19 procedures that should have been in place on the ship  
20 that were not followed, were deviated from for whatever  
21 reasons, what practices that the ship had in place were  
22 not followed and why. If there was this level of  
23 complacency, you know, why did -- why did the event  
24 happen. I would just say that there were a lot of

1 external factors and not -- again, not one single thing  
2 is going to tell you. This is the cause of the  
3 accident, but a lot of outside factors influenced the  
4 outcome: the environment; the haze; the sea state; the  
5 knowledge of having civilians on board; having to get  
6 them back; the ~~asvidu~~ASVDU not working; the fact that  
7 my officer of the deck knew that he needed to stay in  
8 the northern part of that box and so he drove north and  
9 south instead of east and west; the fact that the Ehime  
10 Maru was configured the way that she was, white hull,  
11 white haze, narrow aspect, radar that was very  
12 efficient and clean, minimal acoustic sound signature,  
13 the arrival path.

14 What I'm trying to tell you is there were a  
15 lot of things. There wasn't one single thing that you  
16 could say, well, pilot got vertigo, inverted the plane,  
17 it flew in the ground. Lightning bolt hit the plane,  
18 blew up an engine, it flamed out and crashed. Engine  
19 fell off, plane fell out of the sky. You know, I mean,  
20 there wasn't one single thing that contributed to this,  
21 but there were other things that -- my order to  
22 ~~Cohen~~Coen, you've got five minutes to get to PD, get up  
23 there. My taking the periscope from him after he did  
24 his initial periscope search and didn't do a thorough

1 search where I performed a quick search and was  
2 criticized for being cursory, but I satisfied myself  
3 because I remember looking down on top of the waves  
4 saying, wow, sea state's big, kind of choppy, okay,  
5 what's out here, and sweeping through the Ehime Maru  
6 and not seeing her because I didn't expect to see her.

7 So, you know, I --

8 MR. STRAUCH: Having to get the DVs back, how  
9 did that play a role?

10 MR. WADDLE: I was supposed to be at Pappa  
11 Hotel at 2:00. I think that was the time. Or maybe it  
12 was more -- yeah, I can't remember the details now.  
13 It's been too long.

14 MRS. WADDLE: (Inaudible).

15 MR. WADDLE: But I was. I knew that we were  
16 behind schedule, and so, yeah, I -- I answered Pfeifer  
17 in a trite manner, I think, by saying, I know what I'm  
18 doing. Come on, XO. We're the only one out here,  
19 we're the only boat out here. I know where we are, I  
20 know what we're doing. We'll get back. It's okay. I  
21 know what we're doing, we'll get back.

22 MR. STRAUCH: But you testified that you  
23 weren't in a rush even though you were aware that you  
24 were running behind.

1 MR. WADDLE: Well, I wasn't.

2 MR. STRAUCH: I guess I'm having a hard time.

3 If you weren't in a rush --

4 MR. WADDLE: If I wasn't in a rush, I would  
5 have said, okay, Mr. ~~Cohen~~Coen, let's take all day to  
6 get to periscope depth. We're in no hurry, let's get  
7 back. I didn't want to go through the aggravation of  
8 watching him take a half an hour to clear baffles to  
9 try to get the ship to periscope depth. I said, look,  
10 you've got five minutes, get up there, make this  
11 happen. So, I stood with him in the control room and  
12 gave him very clear orders. Come right here, turn left  
13 here, let's increase the speed, slow down, you're  
14 ready? All right. Permission granted, let's go to  
15 periscope depth.

16 I -- I can clearly see where anyone sitting  
17 on the outside would say, we're not following your  
18 logic, Captain. You tell us you weren't in a hurry,  
19 but you cut corners. You tell us you weren't in a  
20 hurry, but you gave the officer of the deck an  
21 abbreviated time frame with which to operate. You said  
22 you weren't in a hurry, but yet, you did a cursory look  
23 out the periscope.

24 I wouldn't have gone to PD if I -- I knew I



1 had to because it's the right thing to do. It's what  
2 you always do to make sure that there's not a sailboat  
3 just loitering around dead in the water or a small boat  
4 that's fishing floating with its engine off. I looked.

5 I thought I looked adequately close in to make sure  
6 there was nothing there. And so, once that was done,  
7 go deep, let's turn, let's go back up and head out.

8 The emergency blow was going to -- was going  
9 to cut off part of that surfacing evolution because it  
10 would have air in the ballast tanks immediately rather  
11 than coming up to periscope depth, raising the snorkel  
12 mast, lining up the ventilation system to put air in  
13 the forward and aft balance tanks, broaching the ship,  
14 starting the blower, and then driving in on the  
15 surface. It was boom, boom, boom, let's go. And I was  
16 trying to be efficient, and in that I compromised some  
17 of the safety issues.

18 MR. STRAUCH: Well, I guess what I'm asking  
19 is to -- is, you said you weren't in a rush but you  
20 also said you -- you knew you had to get the DVs back.

21 MR. WADDLE: I don't know what they had  
22 scheduled that afternoon, but I knew that staying on  
23 board my ship late at night was not part of the plan.  
24 Wasn't part of my plan, either. I wanted to get back

1     because I wanted to get my crew on liberty. I needed  
2     to get the ship moored so we could shut down the  
3     engineering plant, get the nukes on liberty as well.

4             MR. STRAUCH: So, how did having to get them  
5     back affect the way you did things that day?

6             (Pause)

7             MR. WADDLE: I think the real issue is, was I  
8     trying to do too much in the allotted time frame.  
9     That's the issue. I wanted to show off the submarine,  
10    give them that thrill, you know, that emergency blow  
11    experience so they could say they saw it like you see -  
12    - you know, like you see on The History Channel, the  
13    submarine breaching out of the surface. It's that big  
14    -- that big ride. As -- as ~~Nafman~~Nathman would say, an  
15    e-ticket ride, Commander -- Captain. Yeah.

16            So, if, with the submarine at periscope  
17    depth, I had just said, Mr. ~~Cohen~~Coen, prepare to  
18    surface, that could have been another thing. But I  
19    tried to cram -- I just crammed that emergency blow in.

20    And had we maneuvered to the left, we would have seen  
21    the Ehime Maru, we would have surfaced, said, folks,  
22    I'm sorry, we're out of time, you know, and that's --  
23    that would have been the prudent thing to do, in  
24    hindsight, looking back at it. But it was trying to

1       cram that extra event in that added another 10 or 15  
2       minutes, another 10 minutes or so onto the timeline.

3               MRS. WADDLE: But you were already past.

4               MR. STRAUCH: Since the -- since the  
5       incident, there was a realignment of the -- of the  
6       submarine force, and they put Com Sub Pac underneath  
7       Sub Lant. There was a reorganization, and I'm not real  
8       clear on --

9               MR. WADDLE: I don't know, either.

10              MR. ROTH-ROFFY: October 1st, 2001.

11              MR. WADDLE: I don't -- I'm not part of that  
12       administrative process. I can't comment on it. And  
13       that's something for you to ask someone else.

14              MR. STRAUCH: Okay.

15              MR. WADDLE: Ask me a question, but --

16              MR. STRAUCH: Well, I guess my question was,  
17       did you --

18              MR. WADDLE: Did I feel that was part of the  
19       response to the accident?

20              MR. STRAUCH: No, my question is, were you  
21       aware of anything in oversight of Com Sub Force that  
22       played a part in that reorganization?

23              MR. WADDLE: I have no idea. That's well  
24       outside my area of influence. I -- I can't comment on

1     it.  I don't know.

2                 MR. STRAUCH:  Okay.

3                 MR. WADDLE:  But then, there's always a  
4     struggle between the East Coast and the West Coast.  
5     Whose ocean is bigger, who has more submarines, who's  
6     the more important guy.  Sub Pac has always been  
7     subordinate to Sub Lant.  Sub Lant has always been a  
8     three-star, I think, and Sub Pac's been a two-star for  
9     the longest time, or a one-star.  And we have a lot  
10    more ocean to cover.  There's a lot more activity in  
11    the Pacific than there is in the Atlantic.  I'd like to  
12    say, hey, give up the Russian bear, you know.  With the  
13    day of the Cold War behind us, the action is really in  
14    the Pacific.  If I had my way, you know, I'd -- I'd  
15    change some business, but you know, I'm not -- not in  
16    there.  I don't make those decisions anymore.

17                MR. STRAUCH:  In business, you would change  
18     --

19                MR. WADDLE:  I'd have put -- it's irrelevant  
20    to the discussion here, but clearly, more submarines  
21    are needed in the Pacific than in the Atlantic, and I'd  
22    close down Groton, Connecticut because I hate the  
23    place.  I've never liked it, you know.  It's a rotten  
24    place to operate out of.  And that's, again, irrelevant

1     for this -- for this public record, but -- but Hawaii  
2     is centrally located. You know, developing a presence  
3     in Guam so -- for shorter transit times for submarine  
4     crews to get access to key vital areas of potential  
5     conflict, regional conflict. You know, it's crazy that  
6     we've got the submarine command presence in Hawaii but  
7     yet the surface community is located in San Diego with  
8     the air community headquartered in San Diego.

9             I mean, the Navy structure in itself is  
10    something that should be reviewed and revisited, but I  
11    don't know that it has any bearing or relevance to this  
12    investigation or this line of questioning.

13            MR. STRAUCH: You were -- both you and  
14    Admiral ~~Kinetsnee~~Konetzni testified that -- that your  
15    relationship you talked about here. Since the court of  
16    inquiry, has your relationship with Admiral --

17            MR. WADDLE: Don't hear from him, don't know  
18    what he's doing, don't talk to him, nor he me.

19            MR. STRAUCH: When he said he loved you like  
20    a son, do you think he was telling the truth?

21            MR. WADDLE: I -- yeah -- yeah and no. I  
22    think some of it was act, show. But I -- I do believe  
23    -- I do believe -- Neiderhauser said this to me. He  
24    said, you know, ~~Kinetsnee~~Konetzni's the kind of guy

1     that you've got to watch out for, and he's -- I think  
2     Neiderhauser is one of the still-serving commodores out  
3     there.

4                 MR. ROTH-ROFFY:   Squadron 7.

5                 MR. WADDLE:   Yeah.  He said -- he said -- and  
6     Neiderhauser's a former boss of mine.  He was my  
7     captain on the San Francisco.  He was also PCO  
8     instructor before I went through the pipeline and a  
9     neighbor in Hawaii and a good friend.  Said, Scott, you  
10    know, ~~Kinetsnee~~Konetzni's the kind of guy that'll be  
11    patting you on the back while you're looking at him and  
12    then slipping -- slipping a knife underneath your rib  
13    cage when you're not looking at him.  He'll kill you  
14    quietly while he's smiling at you.  And that's just the  
15    way he worked.

16                Now, that's not to say -- speak ill of the  
17    man, but I'll tell you, if you were on his good side,  
18    you -- good graces, you did well.  If he -- if he  
19    didn't like you, you know, then you had trouble.

20                Smart man, very insightful.  He knew that I  
21    was a disciple of his to -- for lack of a better term  
22    because I did, I admired him greatly.  I would do  
23    anything for him because he -- he was one of the main  
24    reasons why I stayed in the Navy.  That simple pat on

1 the back and handshake that I got back at the Naval  
2 Academy after I passed my engineer's exam was something  
3 that no one had done in my entire Navy career. I have  
4 worked for some really tough men as a junior officer  
5 and hated it, and ~~Kinetsnee~~Konetzni showed me a  
6 different side of a man, that he can have fun. And  
7 then, when I met him in ~~Kusco~~Yokosuka years later, I  
8 loved him and I said, you know, I want to be like him,  
9 and he was a mentor of mine.

10 So, I -- I'd like to believe that that  
11 happened and something still inside me tells me I'd  
12 like to believe that what he said he said in my  
13 stateroom he actually said, but I didn't catch it and I  
14 just don't know why I would have missed something like  
15 that. Scott, you know, you're the one that's informal,  
16 you're the one that's getting ahead of your crew. I  
17 just don't remember that. I really don't,  
18 unfortunately.

19 But I was -- I was invited to his home. We  
20 had nice dinners, private dinners with him, dinners at  
21 social engagements. You know, if the Japanese  
22 consulate had an event and Fred and Cos Harris, two  
23 close friends of his from ~~Kusco~~Yokosuka, Japan were in  
24 town, we would meet. Drinks and cigars with him down

1 in the Cahalla Mandarin where we just happened to be  
2 the same time he was there, not planned. I wouldn't --  
3 what we call butt snorkeling, you know, brown-nosing.  
4 It wasn't -- I didn't do that to get ahead. I loved  
5 the man. I admired the man. He was fun to be around.  
6 Great stories. He energized me. He motivated me.  
7 That's why when we had the deep submergence rescue  
8 vehicle, DSRV, exercise with the Japanese submarine  
9 Hayashio (ph), he came out on my boat, climbed in that  
10 little rescue vehicle, and went over and made it -- 400  
11 feet of water did this. You know, and came back  
12 looking like death warmed over. It was -- it was rough  
13 on the man.

14 But you know, I admired him. He fired up my  
15 crew. He believed in me, I believed in him. I'd have  
16 done anything for him, and I did. I did do anything  
17 for him. Wouldn't do anything dishonest. Wouldn't  
18 compromise my character, but it was tough for me to  
19 hear him say those words. And -- and I truly believed  
20 in what I said.

21 MR. STRAUCH: At the court of inquiry, I  
22 guess the issue of the ~~asvdu~~ASVDU came up and -- and I  
23 got the sense from your testimony that you weren't  
24 really aware that it was out of service until you had



1 already left port.

2 MR. WADDLE: Right. And I -- you know,  
3 reflecting back on that, if the -- if the officer of  
4 the deck had briefed me that -- the navigator, that,  
5 Sir, the ~~asvdu~~ASVDU's out of commission, because I  
6 believe he was the duty officer that day, I'm sure I  
7 acknowledged it and initialed a trouble log. Was there  
8 time to fix it? I didn't have my weapons officer on  
9 board at that time. My sonar chief wasn't there,  
10 either. So, I was missing two key guys to give me the  
11 assessment as to what would be needed and required to  
12 get it fixed. I had a very confident -- two confident  
13 sonar supervisors, Aragon and Reyes, fairly new, who  
14 had great credibility with me in short order. And  
15 McGiveny had been there as well. But those guys knew  
16 that, you know, that's a peripheral remote monitor.  
17 Very important. There's a reason it's down there in  
18 the control room, so you have an independent means of  
19 monitoring what's there and providing backup.

20 But we were -- we were only out for such a  
21 short period of time that I didn't consider it a  
22 prerequisite to repair before we dove the boat and  
23 moved on. And I was also criticized in the court of  
24 inquiry for not having any special written supplemental

1 standing orders and having that kind of stuff in place  
2 to give extra guidance to the ODs. You know, that was  
3 a poor assumption on my part because if something that  
4 I know that that's important is broken, then I assumed  
5 that I had instilled within my men enough common sense  
6 and understanding of ship operations that they would  
7 have accounted for it appropriately.

8 And -- thank you -- the reason we didn't have  
9 a supplemental standing order typed up is, one, I  
10 didn't have the key people that -- that would have  
11 generated the document present on the ship that day.  
12 It was a skeletal organization. Plus, my XO was  
13 involved in providing operational control and oversight  
14 for the events for that morning, ensuring the tours and  
15 things were going, and I had key people busy. We just  
16 didn't have time to sit down, let's focus on generating  
17 a piece of paper so we can satisfy something that, you  
18 know, is not necessary.

19 MR. STRAUCH: If you had been --

20 MR. WADDLE: If I had been underway for more  
21 than 24 hours, a supplemental standing order would have  
22 been written.

23 MR. STRAUCH: And if you had been really  
24 aware that, hey, this is not working when you had gone

1 out, would you have done anything differently?

2 MR. WADDLE: If I had known about it the day  
3 before, I would have directed to have it fixed and  
4 repaired.

5 MR. STRAUCH: Okay.

6 MR. WADDLE: But the fact is, is that,  
7 Captain, we're ready to get underway. Sir, the  
8 ~~asvidu~~ASVDU's not working. Oh, what -- what -- what  
9 now? This thing's broken? All right. Put it in the  
10 trouble log. Enter it in the equipment status log, and  
11 then we'll fix it when we get back to port this  
12 afternoon.

13 MR. STRAUCH: And apparently, from your  
14 testimony, this was not uncommon for the ~~asvidu~~ASVDU to  
15 be out of service?

16 MR. WADDLE: No, that's not true. It -- it  
17 operated, but this power module or whatever it was is a  
18 known -- is a part that's known to be prone to failure  
19 after X-number of hours of operation. So, it's not  
20 like it failed every day, failed every other day, every  
21 week, every other week, every month, every other month.

22 It was one of these random things. But it was known  
23 to have a module that required replacement. It just  
24 happened that it happened that day.

1           MR. STRAUCH: Do you have any questions?

2           MR. ROTH-ROFFY: This is Tom Roth-Roffy now,  
3 and I've just got a few questions.

4           MR. WADDLE: Sure.

5           MR. ROTH-ROFFY: My area is -- is more the  
6 operations and engineering. As you may have guessed,  
7 Barry is doing the human factors, and that's his area  
8 of specialty. So, I wanted to just, maybe, ask you a  
9 few equipment questions.

10          MR. WADDLE: Sure.

11          MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Were there any equipment  
12 problems on the day of the accident that may have  
13 affected the sensor's ability to detect either with the  
14 periscope, the sonar, or the ESM? And I know that --  
15 that the equipment was tested afterward.

16          MR. WADDLE: I'll say, "no," because we'd  
17 just finished a very extensive dry docking selected  
18 restricted availability, and equipment tested and  
19 operated satisfactorily. Now, the water that we had  
20 that came down the hatch in the control room didn't  
21 impact, to my knowledge, my ESM equipment or my sonar  
22 equipment or fire control equipment. It -- it -- it  
23 ended on the deck, and if anything, it -- it wetted the  
24 control surface stations or the controlling station for

1 control surfaces and stuff where the helmsman sits.

2 So, I would say, to my knowledge, no, there  
3 were no equipment issues that would have degraded my  
4 sensor capability. That's why I'm still dumbfounded at  
5 the fact that my ESM operator didn't know it was there,  
6 my sonar operator didn't know the guy was there. It  
7 just -- everything worked. We should have -- we should  
8 have picked up on the fact. But as was -- was proven  
9 in the court of inquiry, we tracked the Ehime Maru for  
10 an hour or so before the collision, I think, and it was  
11 going in a different direction, you know.

12 But the answer's "no." Everything, to my  
13 knowledge, was working that should have been working.

14 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. There -- apparently,  
15 they found some sort of a problem with the gyroscope in  
16 the periscope. Did you notice that when you did your  
17 search?

18 MR. WADDLE: No.

19 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And did it have any -- any  
20 problem?

21 MR. WADDLE: No. Tell me about that. What  
22 is this?

23 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: There's some sort of --

24 MR. WADDLE: Was it off? Meaning that --

1 well, meaning that if I trained the periscope thinking  
2 I'm looking at north --

3 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: No, no. It was -- my  
4 understanding is there's some kind of a gyro --

5 MR. WADDLE: Oh, I know what you're saying.  
6 Yeah, there was.

7 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: -- that was drifting --

8 MR. WADDLE: Right. It -- it would go down  
9 or -- it -- it -- the gyro -- I know what you're saying  
10 now. There's a gyrostabilizer in the Number 2  
11 Periscope that's used usually for photo reconnaissance.  
12 And sometimes it could cause the lens to dip down or  
13 pop up or -- or it -- it wouldn't track. Or, there was  
14 an issue with the lens where it might roll back.

15 But on that day, my optics weren't -- I could  
16 see -- if your point is, could I see clearly out of the  
17 periscope, the answer is "yes" because I had my full  
18 field of view. It wasn't narrow, it wasn't smaller  
19 than -- than expected, from what I recall now.

20 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Sure.

21 MR. WADDLE: On that day, I could -- I could  
22 see to the coastline of Oahu. I just remember that  
23 white belt of haze around the mountain and just seeing  
24 the very top of the peaks. I don't recall any problems

1 with the periscope optics.

2 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And the gyroscope, you  
3 didn't have to overly train the -- I believe it's just  
4 in -- just strictly in a vertical direction, is that --  
5 the stabilized?

6 MR. WADDLE: Right. It stabilizes in a  
7 vertical, but I don't -- I'm usually pretty anal about  
8 that, too, when I take the scope. I -- I look at where  
9 the switches are, and I don't remember the gyroscope  
10 being on. It's one of the things I can reach up and  
11 tell, you know.

12 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: So, it's possible it was not  
13 even engaged?

14 MR. WADDLE: It's very possible mostly  
15 because you don't turn it on until after the submarine  
16 is on the surface or you're at periscope depth for a  
17 prolonged period of time, and then if the waves are  
18 impacting the motion of the ship and the stability of  
19 the periscope optics, then usually the officer of the  
20 deck would reach up and turn it on. Quite frequently  
21 my guys would forget to turn it off. Not just them,  
22 but it's a common thing in the submarine community.  
23 There's no little light in the optic window view screen  
24 that you see that is on saying, like, the gyro's on or

1     you've got the peri-vis thing on.

2             See, part of -- part of the thing, too, that  
3     could have compounded -- and again, it's one of those  
4     what-if things. If, you know, the peri-vis switch, the  
5     periscope visual, which channels 40 percent of the  
6     light from the periscope to a monitoring screen, was  
7     turned on, then that would have cut down on the amount  
8     of light through the scope and made it more difficult  
9     to discern the shape.

10            What I actually think happened in hindsight  
11     here is that I remember standing -- this is the bow.  
12     I'm facing forward. Seacrest would have been over here  
13     to my right. Oahu would have been behind me as we were  
14     heading to the -- to the southeast. And I remember  
15     taking the periscope from Mr. ~~Cohen~~Coen and turning to  
16     the right in a direction where I remember what I  
17     thought one of the surface ships would have been.  
18     Swept the scope in low power, went to high power,  
19     looked, then panned to the right, saw the island, the  
20     belt of haze, saw a plane take off thinking, boy,  
21     that's really odd, I can only see the mountain peak, I  
22     can't see the -- the mountains, but I can just see the  
23     very tip tops of them because of this white haze of  
24     belt around. Then I could see an airplane taking off.



1 Well, that makes sense because the reef runway  
2 extended out beyond the Kualau (ph) Mountain range and  
3 Wyna (ph) Mountain range.

4 And then, I panned to the right where I  
5 thought I would see the Ehime Maru. I looked over at  
6 the remote repeater, and I saw the numbers and that  
7 looks -- that looks right. That's where the guy is.  
8 Didn't see him. Then went to low power and then turned  
9 to the right. I think what happened is the Ehime Maru  
10 was perhaps further to the right, and as I swept in low  
11 power looking through here, I -- I missed her. And --  
12 and that's -- that's the only explanation that I can  
13 think of as to why I missed the vessel. It was perhaps  
14 too far to the right out of my field of view when I was  
15 doing my high power search thinking that the -- the  
16 degree of optics that I was covering would encompass  
17 and overlap that area of uncertainty.

18 I guarantee you if I had seen the vessel I  
19 wouldn't have done what I did. No sane person would  
20 have done that. I mean, I just -- I just didn't see  
21 it.

22 But I -- I don't question the operations of  
23 any of the equipment. And when you said there was a  
24 problem with the gyro repeater, I'm not surprised

1     because I recall we -- we may have had a problem with  
2     the lens rotating up or maybe the gyro not keeping the  
3     view -- field of view stable. I don't think it was a  
4     contributor, though, to the problem.

5             MR. ROTH-ROFFY: You touched briefly on the  
6     issue of active sonar and how it was not -- our  
7     recommendation was not -- was not well-received in the  
8     submarine community. However, in discussions with  
9     several submariners, apparently some submarines use  
10    this HF sonar as part of their periscope-depth search.

11            MR. WADDLE: They can.

12            MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Are you aware of that?  
13    Maybe it varies from coast to coast, east to west?

14            MR. WADDLE: It does. It -- it varies from  
15    coast to coast, it varies from commanding officer to  
16    commanding officer, it varies from proficiency of crew  
17    member to crew member, and it varies depending upon the  
18    nature of the operations. If you're supposed to be  
19    clandestine and quiet, then you don't turn on your  
20    active sonar and say, bing, here I am, you know. But  
21    if you're operating in local area waters, I'm not going  
22    to say there's a reason you can't use it. I mean, that  
23    if you have the ability to man the -- the stack that  
24    you should, why, it makes sense to do so. You've got

1 another set of sensors.

2 But the dilemma here is that when you line up  
3 for use of your active sonar, it takes away from your  
4 passive broadband monitoring on the Legacy systems, so  
5 it does in fact impact your operational alignment and  
6 configuration and it makes that periscope depth  
7 evolution a lot longer. And there's that transition  
8 time from when a submarine is at X-number of feet below  
9 the surface when you're conducting your baffle clear  
10 that you want to minimize the time you're there because  
11 you're close to the surface, you're -- there is little  
12 chance of a collision because of the overlap of a deep  
13 draft merchant and the type -- the height of your sail.

14 But there's that issue that you want to get to the  
15 surface as quickly as you can so that you can determine  
16 there's nothing there. And going through the -- the  
17 process of active sonar is just another step that  
18 you're adding to a procedure that you're trying to  
19 streamline. So, you know, there's a number of reasons  
20 why it's still not well-received from that perspective.

21 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: You mentioned a little bit  
22 about the ARCI and how the technology was, maybe, ahead  
23 of the manning issues and procedural issues.

24 MR. WADDLE: Right.

1           MR. ROTH-ROFFY: You had an ARCI, I believe,  
2     on the boat.

3           MR. WADDLE: We did. We had two of our  
4     Legacy consoles, two of the four had been removed, and  
5     the ARCI had been installed, but ARCI is primarily used  
6     for total ray, not for spherical ray.

7           MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. And you also had  
8     something called Attack 3.

9           MR. WADDLE: Right.

10          MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Was that used normally or  
11     what function did that Attack 3 serve? Because,  
12     apparently, it had a -- a higher computing power, some  
13     other different algorithms. I don't know exactly what  
14     all it was, but it was a new -- newer technology that  
15     was --

16          MR. WADDLE: Again, it's all -- it's all a  
17     manning issue. If I've got two -- if I've got a  
18     broadband operator and then an advanced operator and a  
19     sonar supervisor, and that's three men in sonar, a  
20     supervisor overlooking two guys that are sitting on the  
21     Legacy panels, then for someone else to then operate a  
22     Attack 3 -- does it mean that we can't use it? No, we  
23     can use it. I could -- I could have more people  
24     assigned to stations than I need to, but on that day it

1 was an issue where I didn't have an individual there.

2 The Attack 3 is -- is like a desktop computer  
3 that takes sonar sensor information and it processes  
4 it. And again, under normal circumstances, if I had a  
5 junior officer of the deck standing watch, that would  
6 have been his responsibility to operate the Attack 3  
7 and make it happen. That day we didn't have it manned.

8 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Was it -- how would you  
9 compare the capabilities of Attack 3 to the -- to the  
10 Legacy fire control system that was being manned? Was  
11 there any improvement or did you not like it? Or --

12 MR. WADDLE: Well, it wasn't a question of  
13 "like." Again, it was one of those challenges of do  
14 you have the people. The constant problem that the  
15 Navy is faced with is, do we have qualified people on  
16 board the ship to man the stations to go to sea. And  
17 the issue is, is with the drawdown and the tight money  
18 problems, we've got basic -- we have sonar operators  
19 coming in out of sonar school right now that don't know  
20 squat whereas they used to be, because the curriculum  
21 was long enough and we had enough bodies to fill the  
22 holes, we could get these people almost qualified to be  
23 a basic sonar operator by the time they got to fleet so  
24 all they had to do was learn the unique things about

1 the ship, and then they were readily contributing  
2 members.

3 Well, the same thing is true about the Attack  
4 3. We get all these wonderful additions and we have  
5 schools and classes that I can send a junior officer to  
6 to learn, but more often than not, these guys are  
7 homegrown. You have to teach them through on-the-job  
8 training how to use the stuff. And it's -- it's a  
9 challenge, so if you don't have a guy that knows how to  
10 use it, then sometimes you don't tend to use it.

11 But again, that's -- that's the captain's  
12 problem and not anybody else's. He's got to make sure  
13 that he has requisite people on board that know how to  
14 operate the equipment. Like our ESM, the Whirly 8,  
15 that thing is a dinosaur and a piece of crap when it  
16 comes to electronic surveillance intercept.  
17 Chronically burning cards and material problems with  
18 it, and you have to be almost a genius to figure out  
19 how to troubleshoot, fix, and repair it. And there are  
20 a select few individuals in this world who know how to  
21 do that. A lot of them are former, retired -- former  
22 active duty electronic technicians that are members of  
23 tiger teams that fly away to certain locations to help  
24 fix these problems when you find a gremlin in your --

1 in your gear.

2 But that's the nature of the beast, you know.

3 Antiquated electronic equipment, water-cooled  
4 electronic computers and fire control systems. Don't  
5 know how many companies today are running with water-  
6 cooled electronics, but that's the nature of the beast  
7 there, too. It's part of the design.

8 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. And that's another  
9 question I had, was the ESM. It seems to me the court  
10 of inquiry touched on it but really did not delve into  
11 it that deeply as to why the ESM failed to detect the  
12 Ehime Maru's radar. And you mentioned something which  
13 I had not heard before, is the -- the -- the angle of  
14 propagation from their -- their antenna may have  
15 somehow --

16 MR. WADDLE: It's not the angle of  
17 propagation, but when you look at a -- at a radar  
18 antenna, and this is the -- the front part. You have a  
19 main lobe here.

20 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Correct.

21 MR. WADDLE: You have a back lobe, and then  
22 you usually have two side lobes. In some of the  
23 modern-day radars, you -- you may or may not detect  
24 these side lobes or maybe this back lobe, and so, quite

1 often, the difference between a signal strength one  
2 contact, which is picking up the main lobe or two, main  
3 and back, signal strength three -- which is main, back,  
4 and maybe intermittent side and fore is when you've got  
5 saturation -- is dependent upon the -- the parameters  
6 of this -- of this radar.

7           Again, I had an under-instruction watch  
8 sitting at ESM with head -- with the -- I guess the  
9 over-instruction watch had headphones on and looking at  
10 the screen, too. My over-instruction watch guy -- was  
11 it Cart -- Carter, excuse me, not Carpenter. Carter  
12 was kind of a passive, kind of a quiet guy. Good at  
13 his job, but he may have missed something. And I don't  
14 know that the ESM wasn't working properly, but the  
15 problem that I had, too, is that we're nine miles off  
16 the coast of Oahu off of the reef runway where I've got  
17 FAA radars, I have other commercial radars operating.  
18 So there's a lot of background noise and interference,  
19 and in hindsight, you know, could have spent more time  
20 up there to let ESM sort it out. But usually, they  
21 know pretty quickly when they have a saturated signal  
22 or something that indicates a close-to-board threat.  
23 In this case, it wasn't detected for whatever reason.

24           MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. I'm going to --



1 getting close to the end of the tape, so I'm going to  
2 stop and switch it.

3 MR. WADDLE: All right.

4 (End of Tape 2, Side A)

5 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. We're back on the  
6 record after a short break.

7 MR. WADDLE: Okay. One thing that I wanted  
8 to go back to, and -- and this is not connected to  
9 equipment operations but it was part of this command  
10 climate on my ship. There was this element of mutual  
11 trust where the crew had seen me perform in very  
12 challenging conditions and exit in a very safe manner,  
13 and these were complex contact environments. And I had  
14 seen my crew operate under some very challenging  
15 conditions as well, so there was this mutual respect.  
16 And sometimes I wonder if when I looked out that  
17 periscope and I said, I hold no visual contacts, that  
18 my men let their guard down. Say, well, the captain  
19 doesn't see anything, there isn't anything out there,  
20 we're okay, let's move on. And I believe that that  
21 could have been a contributor here, that that could  
22 have contributed to that complacency and removed that  
23 effective backup that should have been in place where  
24 they say, no, you know, we've got to prove that that's

1 not the case.

2 So -- and it works -- worked both ways. My  
3 guys don't say they see anything, then I've got to be  
4 the diligent man that's up there looking sharp to make  
5 sure. But I believe that because I was respected by my  
6 men and they trusted me so, as I did them, that if they  
7 -- oh, captain says there's nothing up there, that's  
8 got to be the way it is, there's nothing there, so  
9 everything's fine.

10 Okay. Now, I'm ready to go on.

11 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. Getting back to the  
12 ESM, you mentioned something about the characteristics  
13 of the new modern radar have -- not having the side  
14 lobes as a bleed-over.

15 MR. WADDLE: I don't know. That's what I  
16 think. I --

17 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. You think that's a  
18 possibility?

19 MR. WADDLE: I just think that it's -- it's a  
20 very -- it's a crisp -- it's a finely tuned piece of  
21 gear with a great crystal. I -- I don't know. I mean,  
22 I'm not a -- I'm not a physicist when it comes to  
23 knowing radar characteristics, but I'm confident that  
24 each radar has a main lobe, back lobe, and side lobes,

1 or some form or combination of those. I don't know why  
2 we didn't --

3 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Now, is it necessary to  
4 classify a -- a signal strength four or five to detect  
5 those side lobe --

6 MR. WADDLE: No, because --

7 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: -- back lobe --

8 MR. WADDLE: -- the common practice in the  
9 field if you've got a radar that is painting a contact  
10 is you can decrease the power to -- to power output of  
11 that radar while you're continuing to track and paint  
12 that contact, so it gives you the indication that the  
13 source is still distant even though you're continuing  
14 to close and you continue to reduce the power.

15 Assuming that, you know, for a given power output, I  
16 would have expected when I'm in -- within a mile, 2000  
17 yards of another radar, to reach saturation conditions.

18 And for whatever reason, it could have been that we  
19 were just up there too short of time, the operator  
20 didn't -- didn't realize that we didn't detect it.

21 I don't know why we didn't know that the  
22 radar was on, the contact was there.

23 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. You mentioned the ET1  
24 Carter being -- primarily standing the ESM watch --

1 MR. WADDLE: Right.

2 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: -- but my understanding is  
3 you also have this separate ESM -- or, I'm sorry, the  
4 early warning system, which is a audible alert --

5 MR. WADDLE: Right.

6 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: -- in the control room so  
7 that in fact had you a signal strength four or five  
8 that everybody in the control room should have heard it  
9 --

10 MR. WADDLE: Well, --

11 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: -- as well as that --

12 MR. WADDLE: -- well, again, it's background  
13 noise, and that's why I made the point that operating  
14 off the coast of Oahu with all of the air search radars  
15 and other background commercial radars, it -- it's --  
16 it's very difficult to discern something that's close  
17 and a threat.

18 Now, you can hear a high pulse repetition  
19 frequency, a high PRF, radar when you know it's locked  
20 onto a periscope. You discern that difference. But  
21 when we raised the scope that day, you could -- you  
22 could hear the bloop, bloop, beep, boop, all these  
23 beeps and blips and what not as the -- as the scope was  
24 getting painted by a radar signal. But not one

1 particular thing sounded like a blip-blip-blip, and in  
2 the background I couldn't pull that information out  
3 orally. So, again, yes, I heard radar signals but that  
4 wasn't uncommon for what I recall hearing --

5 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: So, are you saying that the  
6 signal strength four or five are really not that  
7 discernible from the other background noise?

8 MR. WADDLE: You can't hear it with the early  
9 warning receiver. It's like if this window could open  
10 and I'd say, all right, tell me how close the cars are  
11 that are driving by, you know, they're out there, you  
12 can hear them out there, but you don't know how close  
13 they are.

14 It's -- it's your -- it's your ESM operator  
15 that can classify and tell you how strong that radiated  
16 signal is once he detects it. And his skill is, one,  
17 to detect it orally, and then, two, when he hears it,  
18 to scan the bandwidth to pick up where it is and then  
19 determine the strength of the signal based on the  
20 amplitude that -- of the -- of the signal that he's  
21 receiving. And frankly, you know, we may have been too  
22 short of a time for him to actually get into the  
23 analysis phase. I don't know.

24 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Now, talking about the fire

1 control system, you have an automated system called  
2 CAST which you alluded to before --

3 MR. WADDLE: Mm-hmm.

4 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: -- that actually had a good  
5 solution on the Ehime Maru but for some reason was not  
6 recognized. Did -- is that something that -- that the  
7 operators and the officer of the deck and the CO  
8 normally look at, is the CAST solution?

9 MR. WADDLE: No, you look at --

10 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Do you rely on that?

11 MR. WADDLE: -- you look at a system  
12 solution, not the CAST. But you expect your fire  
13 control operator to balance the CAST solution against  
14 his updated solution to make sure it makes sense. I  
15 mean, if CAST is telling you the contact's at 2000  
16 yards and your generated solution is at 14,000, you've  
17 got a problem. And it's just sloppiness. Shouldn't  
18 have happened.

19 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Is there often a -- a large  
20 disparity between the CAST solution and --

21 MR. WADDLE: It depends.

22 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: I mean, it's just  
23 unpredictable that --

24 MR. WADDLE: Not unpredictable. It's just if

1     -- if -- if you maneuver frequently enough on a contact  
2     to -- to provide the -- the generated bearing rate to  
3     allow the computer to come up with an independent  
4     solution, then CAST is very good.  If you don't, then  
5     CAST isn't very good.  Even the computer has its  
6     limitations, but over time with adequate maneuvers the  
7     CAST solution will give you a solution that is very  
8     fair, if not good or accurate.

9             MR. ROTH-ROFFY:  So, in -- in maneuvering the  
10     submarine, is -- is that not something that you would  
11     aim to do, is to -- to minimize that CAST error?

12            MR. WADDLE:  Exactly, and that's why --  
13     that's for just general target motion analysis.  That's  
14     why I mentioned earlier that had ~~Cohen~~Coen, in  
15     hindsight, maneuvered the ship on more east-westerly  
16     legs than north-south, then he would have been able to  
17     drive bearing rate to the Ehime Maru or any contacts to  
18     the north and confirm their range.

19            I didn't pick up on the fact, looking back at  
20     the nav plot or look at -- the CEP because it hadn't  
21     been updated for a while, that the -- that we had  
22     driven on north-south legs.

23            I could tell you that walking into the sonar  
24     room and I asked McGiveny, what contacts do you have?

1 Sir, I have these two. What do they sound like? Sound  
2 like trollers or small vessels, small craft. What are  
3 the bearings? Here they are. Northwest, northeast.  
4 Close or far? They're distant, sir. They're --  
5 they're up by land. Okay.

6 Walk over to fire control system with the GO  
7 display there, and I see two contacts up off the coast  
8 of Oahu. It made sense to me. Sonar just told me what  
9 they had, fire control has validated that information.

10 I look over at the nav plot. We're here, nine miles  
11 away is land, seven miles away. Not an unrealistic  
12 solution for a contact going up the northeast to  
13 Diamondhead or one traveling northwest, maybe going  
14 wherever. So, it made sense to me and that's how I  
15 recall ships over the last ten years operating in  
16 Hawaii based on my personal experience. I didn't think  
17 about a narrow aspect, constant bearing, decreasing  
18 range kind of guy. And the CAST solution driving north  
19 and south, although the maneuvers were adequate for  
20 that solution, over time, over an hour or so, proved to  
21 be the more accurate one, unfortunately.

22 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: I've read a little bit about  
23 the -- the British submarines. I don't know if you're  
24 familiar with the way they operate.



1 MR. WADDLE: No.

2 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: You alluded to the fact that  
3 they have two separate pipelines: the tactical people  
4 and the engineering people.

5 MR. WADDLE: Mm-hmm.

6 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: But I -- I've also read that  
7 they have an automated TMA arrangement --

8 MR. WADDLE: Can't tell you.

9 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. I know -- well, --

10 MR. WADDLE: -- don't know.

11 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: -- really, my question was,  
12 do you see a place for increased automation on -- on  
13 U.S. submarines, some sort of oral alert that would --  
14 would force the person to acknowledge that, you know,  
15 he's operating either nearby another contact or near  
16 shallow water or -- because --

17 MR. WADDLE: Sure. Alarms and warnings are  
18 always good, but you know, what do you do when you're  
19 operating in those challenging environments where  
20 you're closing within hundreds of yards of small craft  
21 that are, maybe, not metallic in structure? You know,  
22 you don't want -- and I'm talking some very challenging  
23 shallow water tactical littoral environments, and you  
24 don't want an alarm constantly going off, "Danger," you

1 know, "Pull up" or "Turn left" or "Too low" or "Wind  
2 shear." I mean, you know, you hear those things on  
3 airplanes. I mean, if I had that, I'd say, turn that  
4 damn thing off. I know I got somebody close. I can  
5 see the son of a gun. Turn it off.

6 But am I for automation? Yes, I am, but the  
7 human element is always going to be there and you can't  
8 take that independent element out of the equation.  
9 Someone's got to be able to judge the data to make sure  
10 that it's -- it's real.

11 In the court of inquiry, it was made  
12 painfully clear that all that information was there. I  
13 don't refute that. But I'll tell you, my men didn't  
14 have time to visually integrate it, assimilate it,  
15 evaluate it, and act on it in that manner. Just say,  
16 okay, we've got 15 seconds of data, ooh, high bearing  
17 rate, Captain, we need to do this. No, they didn't see  
18 it. They didn't see it, and hindsight's always 20/20.

19 Anything else?

20 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: I think that's about all I  
21 have for right now. I believe Barry has a couple more  
22 questions.

23 MR. WADDLE: Sure.

24 MR. STRAUCH: Yeah, just a few more.

1 MR. WADDLE: Okay.

2 MR. STRAUCH: Two of the questions and -- at  
3 the court of inquiry kind of -- kind of intrigued me.  
4 The -- I guess there was an issue that -- the question  
5 was about Lieutenant ~~Stong (ph).~~ Sloan. He -- did you  
6 -- information that he did or did not give you about  
7 the visibility to the north.

8 MR. WADDLE: Right.

9 MR. STRAUCH: And the color of the hull.

10 MR. WADDLE: Right. I -- I just touched on  
11 that. I said that that report did not make it to me.

12 MR. STRAUCH: Okay. What report was that  
13 that --

14 MR. WADDLE: When -- when he was the officer  
15 of the deck looking out the periscope -- or, he was the  
16 contact coordinator -- I don't recall which one.  
17 Probably officer of the deck because until a certain  
18 point that the ship is outside 10 miles from land, he's  
19 part of the navigating-piloting party. He runs the --  
20 he runs the modified piloting party unless the  
21 navigation supervisor is there.

22 And Sloane must have been acting as the  
23 contact coordinator looking out the periscope for some  
24 time, and he saw two visual contacts. One was easier

1 to pick out than the other. The dark-hulled one was  
2 easier to pick out and discern from the white haze  
3 background for obvious reasons. And the white one was  
4 more challenging, again, for obvious reasons. But that  
5 report was not made to me as part of his watch relief  
6 report.

7 MR. STRAUCH: Was he required to give you  
8 that --

9 MR. WADDLE: Should have. I would have  
10 expected that. Captain, the environment is changing.  
11 That was one of my standing orders, if there's a  
12 significant change in sea state or environment, then  
13 there's certain precautions that we take.

14 MR. STRAUCH: And if he had given that to  
15 you, that report to you, how would that have affected  
16 the way you did things?

17 MR. WADDLE: It may have made me look a  
18 little bit harder knowing that -- that visibility was  
19 somewhat questionable looking out the scope. If I knew  
20 it was going to be more challenging to pull contacts  
21 out, I'm speculating here, but I would like to think  
22 that I would have spent more time, looked a little bit  
23 harder, maybe come shallower. Hard to say.

24 MR. STRAUCH: The other quote is in reference

1 to the three-minute TMA legs, and let me quote from  
2 this question that was asked of you.

3 "Why did you set aside these principles?" and  
4 it was referring is the, I guess, the standing orders.

5 MR. WADDLE: Yeah. I thought I addressed  
6 that in the first part of our discussion.

7 MR. STRAUCH: Well, let me -- let me read the  
8 rest --

9 MR. WADDLE: Okay.

10 MR. STRAUCH: -- of the quote. "Why did you  
11 set aside these principles that are -- that have been  
12 founded in blood, lessons learned, what people ahead of  
13 us, what was the rush? Why did you give that type of  
14 order that caused indisputably to have your watch team  
15 forego -- not do the types of things that they are used  
16 to doing?" Is -- what do you think about his  
17 characterization of standing -- of -- of the orders  
18 regarding three-minute legs, that they were "founded in  
19 blood"? Can you just comment on that?

20 MR. WADDLE: I'm -- I think I -- again, I  
21 think I addressed that as being a red herring.

22 MR. STRAUCH: Okay. All right.

23 MR. WADDLE: I -- I believe I have already  
24 answered that question, but I'll state it again. The

1       -- the -- there were times when -- I don't know  
2 personally, but based on second reports or reports from  
3 men that were subordinate to me that had served on a  
4 submarine with Sullivan where he had taken the  
5 submarine to -- his submarine, his command -- to  
6 periscope depth without doing baffle clears because he  
7 felt it prudent to -- to do so, that he could. The big  
8 ocean, little ship theory, that there's nobody out  
9 here, and for whatever reason, he needed to get up  
10 there. Now, I don't know that to be true, but that's  
11 what a shipmate of mine told me.

12               MR. STRAUCH: So, what he's referring to is  
13 lessons learned in blood, those -- were those -- would  
14 those be equivalent to what you referred to earlier as  
15 guidelines?

16               MR. WADDLE: Yeah, those are the guidelines.  
17 And it's kind of like the auditing practices of large  
18 and major companies now will more than likely be  
19 changed in view of the collapse of Enron. That's a  
20 lesson that's been written in blood. Why? Because you  
21 had an executive committing suicide. He killed himself  
22 for it. He had family lives that were destroyed. And  
23 so, I'd like to think that business practices will  
24 change their accounting methods.

1           Business is business, but in the Navy, it's  
2   kind of like the tag-out system which is used to hang  
3   specific tags on valves, components, electrical  
4   switches when you're conducting a repair. It'd be like  
5   pulling the car ignition key or the key out of the  
6   ignition and putting a tag on it "Do not use" while  
7   you're under the hood of the car working on something  
8   so that someone doesn't come in, turn the ignition key  
9   on, and zap you or get your arm caught in the fan belt  
10   or whatever. Or, you take the cable off a battery and  
11   you tape it up or whatever as a precautionary measure  
12   to ensure that while you're working on an electrical  
13   thing no power gets through and shocks you.

14           We say that these are lessons that are  
15   written in blood and loss of life, et cetera, so why  
16   would you deviate from them? Well, you know what, it's  
17   a guideline. And granted, in hindsight, it would have  
18   been great if I had a six-minute leg, if I'd had a 10-  
19   minute leg, but in that period I thought that my  
20   maneuver was adequate. Yeah, they failed to  
21   acknowledge the fact that I got the submarine to  
22   periscope depth safely without hitting anything. So  
23   the legs were irrelevant. That's another red herring.  
24   The fact that I spent three minutes on a TMA leg here

1     and 30 seconds on this one is irrelevant. The fact is,  
2     is that my maneuver was adequate to verify there was  
3     nothing close. I got the ship to periscope depth.  
4     What could have been improved was the visual search,  
5     the ESM search, but it was all cut short because I  
6     intervened because I was satisfied that there was  
7     nothing there, and that, again, is one of the  
8     shortfalls.

9             In hindsight, after looking at everything,  
10    despite what I thought was a geographic picture,  
11    despite what I thought was a contact picture as well,  
12    and reports from my sonar operator, ESM, and officer of  
13    the deck, there really was somebody close and I missed  
14    him. As the -- as the last source of backup, I missed  
15    it and I should have stepped back and taken a look at  
16    that whole forest instead of that one tree. I was too  
17    close to the problem, and that's -- that's where I  
18    personally -- I hold myself accountable. I allowed  
19    myself to get too close to that evolution that I -- I  
20    didn't step back.

21            And my executive officer Jerry Pfeifer has  
22    always been there for me, and he has -- when I would  
23    get too close he'd step back or if he got too close,  
24    I'd step back. There was always that balance. On that



1 day, I don't know what went wrong, but we didn't do it  
2 right.

3 And that man to this day I know regrets  
4 opening his mouth to this organization when he said  
5 early on, you know, I was uncomfortable with the speed  
6 with which things were going, it was going too fast,  
7 and I thought, whoa, this isn't right, but I didn't  
8 open my mouth. You know what? He lied. And it's  
9 clear in the court of inquiry testimony later when his  
10 attorney made a point, didn't you ever say something  
11 under pressure that you really regret not saying --  
12 that you really regret that you said, that you wish you  
13 hadn't said, because it made Jerry look like a dumb  
14 ass. He wasn't any more concerned about what we were  
15 doing. He thought what we were doing was fine. He was  
16 comfortable with it, as was everybody else in that  
17 control room because we didn't expect the outcome that  
18 we got.

19 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Actually, his comments, just  
20 to correct the record, were made to the preliminary  
21 investigation.

22 MR. WADDLE: All right.

23 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: He chose not to -- to  
24 discuss accidents prior to the collision with the --

1 MR. WADDLE: Right.

2 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: -- NTSB.

3 MR. WADDLE: Has he interviewed with you  
4 afterwards?

5 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Yes, he has. When was it?

6 MR. STRAUCH: About --

7 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: November. Several months  
8 ago he did --

9 MR. WADDLE: That -- in Washington, D.C.?

10 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Correct.

11 MR. WADDLE: Okay. I'd be interested to --  
12 do you have his written record in response?

13 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: No.

14 MR. STRAUCH: Actually, we have the  
15 transcript.

16 MR. WADDLE: I'm interested in getting a copy  
17 of that to read what he had to say.

18 MR. STRAUCH: That would be -- I don't know  
19 if it's been -- (inaudible) -- public docket --  
20 (inaudible) -- when it is, we'd be glad to get it to  
21 you.

22 MR. WADDLE: Sure.

23 MR. STRAUCH: In other words, our public  
24 docket is our way of making things available to the

1 public.

2 MR. WADDLE: And I -- and I support that  
3 because from the -- from the beginning my only desire  
4 for this whole thing was to get to the truth,  
5 regardless of what embarrassment it caused me because  
6 there was no excuse for that loss of life that the  
7 accident caused. And the bottom line, again, I stand  
8 by, it was just a horrible tragic accident that could  
9 have been averted if a lot of things had been  
10 different.

11 MR. STRAUCH: I just have one last question.

12 MR. WADDLE: Sure.

13 MR. STRAUCH: Can you walk us through your --  
14 your background? If you could begin with, when did you  
15 want to become part of the Navy?

16 MR. WADDLE: Well, my biography, I believe,  
17 has been printed, you know, and made accessible on the  
18 -- on the Net, but to keep it short, I'm the son of an  
19 Air Force colonel. My stepfather is a retired Air  
20 Force lieutenant colonel. My father and stepfather  
21 both had 30-plus years in the Air Force, distinguished  
22 careers, combat pilots. And I wanted to be a pilot. I  
23 didn't want to be a submariner.

24 A company officer at the Naval Academy was a

1     submariner. I didn't think too highly of him because  
2     of the -- he was one of these guys that couldn't make a  
3     decision when there wasn't a rule to provide a  
4     guideline. It was either black or white, and I  
5     thought, gosh, you know, for these gray areas, you're a  
6     commissioned officer, you're a lieutenant, can't you  
7     figure this out? I mean, it was puzzling to me as a  
8     young, young man that this man couldn't make a  
9     decision. I thought he was spineless.

10           And my sponsor was a guy that was a submarine  
11     commander as well, and I learned a little bit about the  
12     community and was talked into going into a submarine  
13     for my freshman summer cruise, end of -- end of  
14     freshman year summer cruise. I didn't think too much  
15     of it, I didn't really like it, but it was an  
16     experience. I still wanted to fly, but as my time at  
17     the Naval Academy progressed and I realized that my  
18     vision, which is still about 20/25, wasn't going to be  
19     good enough to get me in the front seat of a plane,  
20     then I had to look for alternatives.

21           And that's when I interviewed with Admiral  
22     Rickover. I was accepted into the program. Became a  
23     submariner. I didn't know that I had to request to go  
24     into the surface community. I would have much rather

1     been a surface nuke than a submariner because, to be  
2     honest with you, I didn't like being enclosed in that  
3     underwater environment. It just -- it's not me. I  
4     need the outdoors, I need the sun, and so on.

5             But I ended up in the submarine community.  
6     Didn't like my first tour. I worked for a man that was  
7     a total tyrant. Hard, hard man, as was the case back  
8     then, but I knew that I could still take care of my  
9     men. I was always very close and protective of them.  
10    Not a renegade, but I -- I -- I didn't fall in line  
11    with the typical rhetoric that was preached. I -- I  
12    walked to the beat of a different drum, and I kind of  
13    always have. I've been the champion for the individual  
14    that was picked on or not treated fairly, and I always  
15    believed in the cause of the individual, sometimes over  
16    the cause of the organization. That's not to say that  
17    the collective good of the organization wasn't  
18    important, but I just -- I value people because I know  
19    how I like to be treated.

20            And I developed my leadership traits. I had  
21    mentors early on that were very important to me that  
22    made a difference in life when times were tough. Had  
23    some inspirational men come along and give me the pat  
24    on the back that decided whether I got in the Navy or

1     stayed out -- or, got out or stayed in.

2             Met Jill when we were -- when the ship --  
3     submarine moved to Washington, and she was an important  
4     part of my life. And that decision process, we were  
5     pregnant with Ashley. The economy, the day back in '86  
6     was such that it wasn't good for me to get out and try  
7     to find a job. And so, we moved to Italy. Again, some  
8     challenging events occurred there, again working for  
9     some hard people and the -- and I had some great people  
10    to work for, too. But that's the way the military is.

11    You know, you have the good and bad and so on.

12            I was in the staff of Submarine Group 8,  
13    enjoyed our tour there. Then became initial manning  
14    engineer on the Kentucky as my second tour, second  
15    submarine that I built the general dynamics. Did very  
16    well, was very successful there, and had limited  
17    experience in operating the submarine. A year in  
18    comparison with, perhaps, three years as most of my  
19    peers would have had on operational ships, but again,  
20    my strength was in construction, testing, operation, et  
21    cetera.

22            But I had the requisite skill that was  
23    needed. Got my ticket punched, and became a member of  
24    the Inspection Board at the NPB -- examining board in

1 the Pacific. Inspected 57 ships, saw how they  
2 operated, gained more experience there. XO of the San  
3 Francisco. Admiral Enright, now the serving group  
4 commander of Submarine Group 7, ~~Kusoe~~Yokosuka, Japan,  
5 was my submarine squadron seven commander when I was  
6 XO, and I remember there was great concern over the  
7 fact that the submarine was going to deploy on short  
8 notice and here you've got this officer and an XO that  
9 we're going to make a command duty officer on these  
10 special operations and he doesn't have Fast Attack  
11 experience, how's he going to do? Well, I did just  
12 fine. I did better than fine. I did very good. Very  
13 well.

14 Left my XO tour, which was very successful.  
15 Gained notoriety for my accomplishments in that job. I  
16 was a -- I was a tough XO to work for, as most XOs are  
17 because you play the bad guy more often than the good  
18 guy, which is what the captain usually gets to be.  
19 That's how I liked it to be. The XO gets to make the  
20 tough calls unless the captain has to intervene and  
21 there are decisions that need to be made by him.

22 But my career has been filled with -- career  
23 was filled with 20 years of some extremely memorable  
24 and fond events and some that weren't so pleasant. I

1 have overcome challenges with difficult bosses, and  
2 I've enjoyed the time that I've worked with men that  
3 were great to work for. Glen Neiderhauser's one of the  
4 guys you're getting ready to go meet, and he was a  
5 phenomenal captain. He did more to raise my self-  
6 esteem by allowing me to do my job than any other man I  
7 served with.

8 So, the Navy was very much my life. I lived,  
9 ate, slept, and drank the Navy. My family came second.  
10 Really did. And I realize that now that I've had over  
11 six months to regain more control over my life and my  
12 time. Spend quality time with my family. Lot of  
13 personal sacrifices that are made.

14 But, when I was away from my family, I had  
15 another family, and that other family was my -- my  
16 crew. I love my men. I -- I -- I lost a lot on that  
17 day on February 10th when the submarine returned from  
18 sea and I had to go to Admiral ~~Kinetsnee~~Konetzni and he  
19 gave me the letter saying you're detached for --  
20 (inaudible) -- effective immediately. My chief of the  
21 boat Doug Kaufman was just reduced to tears.

22 Driving over in the truck I thought, what's  
23 wrong? Never in my wildest dreams did I ever envision  
24 that I would get fired, and I don't know why. It



1     happened to every other captain that had a collision or  
2     a problem. It wouldn't happen to me, I thought,  
3     because Admiral ~~Kinetsnee~~Konetzni's going to know that  
4     this was just a horrible, freak accident. He's going  
5     to know that because he knows me and he made this  
6     comment in private. Said, Scott, if there was a  
7     submarine that I had to have or had to pick to be  
8     involved in this horrible, tragic accident, there's no  
9     other vessel than yours that I would have picked. I  
10    thought, that's a shitty thing to say, what the hell --  
11    what do you mean by that?

12                 But it's something that both he and I  
13    understand. I think it's because he knows that there  
14    wasn't -- I don't think there's anybody else out there  
15    that could have done what I did, stand tall to do the  
16    right thing, to communicate to America that, you know,  
17    military men and women serving in uniform are  
18    accountable and are responsible for their actions.

19                 Now, you don't always see that. Not every  
20    commander does that. I chose to, and I believe that's  
21    why there's some resentment in the Navy still today.  
22    That's why I've never been asked to come back to the  
23    Naval Academy to speak to the midshipmen at Forrestal  
24    lectures or I haven't been asked to -- to go on the

1 speaker's circuit with the Navy to speak firsthand to  
2 the people that matter. The Navy has swept this thing  
3 under the rug. They've written their case study and  
4 they've put things in articles.

5 But the Air Force saw fit to have me as a  
6 principal speaker three weeks ago at the ninth annual  
7 Leadership and Character Symposium, and I spoke in  
8 front of 4000 people on the value of personal integrity  
9 and uncompromising character and ethics and how I was  
10 involved in this event. And I spoke to the 325th  
11 Fighter Wing I mentioned at Tindale Air Force Base as  
12 well. And the Air Force has openly embraced me and  
13 they see the value and importance of that, and the Navy  
14 is too shallow-minded, narrow-minded, and still so  
15 resentful over the fact that this event happened that  
16 they would much rather not see me in front of anyone in  
17 that organization, and that's -- that's unfortunate  
18 because it's going to happen.

19 And what's happening today is this particular  
20 accident is now a big case study and it's probably the  
21 first accident that's covered on the collision and  
22 grounding briefings, and I would think you want to ask  
23 about something, ask to see the Submarine Development  
24 Squadron 12 collision and grounding presentation where

1 the Navy has addressed what it believes are the causes  
2 behind this accident, and let's see if you agree with  
3 their findings. A lot of it is going to be slanted  
4 towards the outcome of the preliminary inquiry  
5 conducted by Admiral ~~Griffis~~Griffiths and the court of  
6 inquiry by Admiral ~~Nafman~~Nathman, but look at that  
7 product. There's probably some written material, and  
8 you may want to ask for it and they may say, well, it's  
9 classified, but then I think that's a bunch of hooey.  
10 If you wanted to look at it, you know, there's a lot  
11 that's out there that you could probably look at.

12 But in -- this is not, again, answering your  
13 question about my career, but I enjoyed what I did, and  
14 let's just say that I've answered that question. But  
15 the Navy isn't any more interested in having the  
16 National Transportation Safety Board come into its  
17 offices and to continue its investigation than you or I  
18 are in having the Internal Revenue come in and dispatch  
19 an agent to look at our tax records. It's just the  
20 truth. It's not anything against you guys. It's just  
21 that this is -- this is yet, ah, ah, they're back, oh,  
22 we thought this thing was over and behind us, oh,  
23 they're back again, all right, men. And I tell you,  
24 they're going to battle stations now and they are

1 absolutely just dreading the fact that you're coming.

2 And if they know that you talked to me,  
3 they're going to be very interested in knowing what I  
4 had to say, and I'm very surprised that there wasn't a  
5 naval representative or some type of officer present at  
6 these proceedings to refute what I've said or comment  
7 on them. And they will. And they'll come back and  
8 they'll say, well, that's a bunch of hooey, too. But  
9 that's their opinion, and I've given you mine.

10 And I've given you my candid opinions, trying  
11 to remove the emotion, the resentment, the feelings of  
12 betrayal to some extent that I've -- that I've felt in  
13 order to give you the best unbiased and direct,  
14 truthful answers that I can and to help you in this  
15 investigative cause because my obligation is not to the  
16 Navy and it's not to you, but it's to the families that  
17 lost their members and loved ones in hopes that you are  
18 then aided in coming up with recommendations and  
19 solutions that can help these things from happening  
20 again.

21 But as the guy said in his article, these  
22 aren't new lessons. We've had collisions and  
23 groundings before. This isn't anything new. It's just  
24 a different version of the story.

1           MR. STRAUCH: I don't have any more  
2 questions. Do you have any -- any questions of us  
3 before we finish up?

4           MR. WADDLE: Not that I want to ask on the  
5 record.

6           MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. So --

7           MR. STRAUCH: Want to go off the record?

8           MR. ROTH-ROFFY: The time is now about 13:18,  
9 and this concludes our conversation with Mr. Scott  
10 Waddle. Thank you very much.

11          MR. WADDLE: You're welcome, gentlemen.

12                 (Whereupon, at 1:18 p.m., on March 14, 2002,  
13 the proceedings were concluded.)

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